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HOW THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRUSTRATES THE 
REGULATION OF POLICE VIOLENCE 
Seth W. Stoughton* 
ABSTRACT 
Within policing, few legal principles are more widely known or highly 
esteemed than the “objective reasonableness” standard that regulates police 
uses of force. The Fourth Amendment, it is argued, is not only the facet of 
constitutional law that governs police violence, it sets out the only standard that 
state lawmakers, police commanders, and officers should recognize. Any other 
regulation of police violence is inappropriate and unnecessary. 
Ironically, though, the Constitution does not actually regulate the use of 
force. It regulates seizures. Some uses of force are seizures. This Article explains 
that a surprising number of others—including some police shootings—are not. 
Uses of force that do not amount to seizures fall entirely outside the ambit of 
Fourth Amendment regulation. And when a use of force does constitute a 
seizure, the Fourth Amendment is a distressingly inapt regulatory tool. There is, 
in short, a fundamental misalignment between what the Fourth Amendment is 
thought to regulate and what it actually regulates, and there are good reasons 
to doubt the efficacy of that regulation even when it applies. Put simply, the 
Fourth Amendment is a profoundly flawed framework for regulating police 
violence. 
The Constitution is not the only option. Police reformers have offered state 
law and police agency policies as promising regulatory alternatives. What has 
largely evaded academic attention, however, is the extent to which state courts 
and police agencies simply adopt or incorporate the constitutional standards 
into state law or agency policies. In this way, the Fourth Amendment’s flaws 
have spilled over into the sub-constitutional regulation of police violence. 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I am thankful to my 
University of South Carolina colleagues as well as the participants of the 2019 Law of the Police Conference 
(Geoff Alpert, Kami Chavis, Mary Fan, Barry Friedman, Rachel Harmon, David Harris, Ashley Heiberger, 
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Criminal Law Roundtable, panel attendees at CrimFest! 2019, participants in a Duke Law Center for Science & 
Justice Works-in-Progress virtual workshop, and Jeff Noble for their helpful thoughts and suggestions. All errors 
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editorial assistance of the Emory Law Journal. As always, I am grateful for the support of Alisa Stoughton. 
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This Article details the substantial shortcomings in constitutional 
jurisprudence, describes the problem of Fourth Amendment spillage, and argues 
that the divergent interests underlying the various regulatory mechanisms 
should lead state lawmakers and administrative policymakers to divorce state 
law and administrative policies from constitutional law. In doing so, it advances 
both academic and public conversations about police violence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Within policing, few legal principles are more widely known or highly 
esteemed than the “objective reasonableness” standard that regulates police uses 
of force. Over the last thirty years, Graham v. Connor1 has not only been quoted 
and cited thousands of times in litigation and judicial opinions, it has also 
featured prominently in police training and police-oriented publications.2  
Today, Graham v. Connor is a clear example of police orthodoxy. When the 
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) suggested in 2016 that police 
“[a]gencies should continue to develop best policies, practices, and 
training . . . that go beyond the minimum requirements of Graham v. Connor,”3 
the backlash was swift and vehement. The International Association of Chiefs 
of Police (IACP) and the Fraternal Order of Police—organizations that are not 
typically bedfellows when it comes to positions on police policy—promptly 
released a joint statement “reject[ing] any call to require law enforcement 
agencies to unilaterally, and haphazardly, establish use-of-force guidelines that 
exceed the ‘objectively reasonable’ standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court . . . .”4 Police-oriented publications printed articles criticizing PERF’s 
recommendations.5 Officers and union officials denounced police chiefs who 
supported those recommendations, with at least one union going so far as to call 
a vote of no confidence because of a chief’s interest in implementing some of 
the PERF-backed reforms.6 
There was a similar reaction in 2018 when California legislators proposed 
the Police Accountability and Community Protection Act, which would have 
authorized the use of deadly force only when it was “necessary to prevent 
 
 1 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In Graham, the Court held that claims that officers who used excessive force 
were to be assessed under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, and thus 
that officers’ uses of force were constitutional so long as they were objectively reasonable. Id. at 397. 
 2 Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 865 (2014). 
 3 POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 35 (2016), https://www.policeforum. 
org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf. 
 4 Chuck Canterbury & Terrence Cunningham, Statement of the Fraternal Order of Police and the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police on Use of Force Standards, FRATERNAL ORD. POLICE, https://fop. 
net/CmsDocument/Doc/FOP-IACP_UseofForceStatement.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
 5 See, e.g., Kevin Davis, Editorial: PERF and Its Questionable Principles, OFFICER.COM (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.officer.com/investigations/article/12174475/perf-and-their-questionable-principles; Richard Fairburn, 
PERF’s UOF Report Illustrates Disconnect Between Street Cops, Administrators, POLICE1 (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.police1.com/use-of-force/articles/perfs-uof-report-illustrates-disconnect-between-street-cops-
administrators-k15J8s92bri5weQU/. 
 6 Jacob Beltran, Police Union to Take Vote of ‘No Confidence’ on McManus, MYSANANTONIO (Mar. 9, 
2016), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/Police-union-to-take-vote-of-no-confidence-6878688.php. 
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imminent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person.”7 The 
California Peace Officers Association criticized the proposal for “rais[ing] the 
legal use of force standard” above that laid out in Graham v. Connor.8 As the 
president of the San Diego Police Officers Association wrote, “Abandoning the 
‘reasonableness’ standard pertaining to a police officer’s use of force set by 
[Graham] would greatly hinder law enforcement officers and therefore endanger 
the communities they serve”; anything other than continued reliance on the 
constitutional standard established in Graham would be “unrealistic and 
unacceptable . . . .”9 
The message was clear: the Fourth Amendment is not only the source of 
constitutional law that governs police violence;10 it sets out the only standard 
that state lawmakers, police commanders, and officers themselves should 
recognize. Any additional regulation is unnecessary, if not dangerously 
counterproductive. 
 
 7 A.B. 931, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). The proposal defined “necessary” as those situations 
in which “an objectively reasonable peace officer would conclude that there was no reasonable alternative to the 
use of deadly force that would prevent imminent death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or to another 
person.” Id. “Reasonable alternatives,” in turn, were defined as “tactics and methods, other than the use of deadly 
force, of apprehending a subject or addressing a situation that do not unreasonably increase the threat posed to 
the peace officer or another person.” Id. For purposes of disclosure, I helped with drafting parts of the bill, 
ultimately testifying before a state senate committee and submitting two letters supporting the bill. I also assisted 
with the successor bill the following year, A.B. 392, 2018–19 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), drafting some 
language and submitting two letters of support. 
 8 Shaun Rundle, Use of Force Legislation Negotiations Prove Nothing Has Changed, CAL. PEACE OFFS. 
ASS’N (Jan. 15, 2019), https://cpoa.org/use-of-force-legislation-negotiations-prove-nothing-has-changed/. 
 9 Jack Schaeffer, Commentary: Why Lawmakers Shouldn’t Change the Standard for Police Use of Force, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 13, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/ 
commentary/sd-utbg-california-police-force-20180613-story.html. 
 10 I use the terms “police use of force” and “police violence” synonymously. I acknowledge that “use of 
force” (or, more recently, “response to resistance”) are industry standard terms. As David Sklansky has 
persuasively argued, though, such terminology “has a euphemistic quality” that obscures the operational reality 
of officer actions in a way that meaningfully hinders public conversations. DAVID SKLANSKY, THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF BLOOD: HOW THE LAW THINKS ABOUT VIOLENCE (forthcoming) (excerpt on file with 
author). As I have asserted elsewhere, “Treating police violence as a static, hygienic exercise of government 
authority insulates society from the consequences of its approval, unfairly shifting disapprobation for police 
actions onto individual officers instead of the society that condoned some abstract understanding of what they 
would be doing. It allows society to overlook or ignore the raw reality of police violence, and thus frees us from 
having to confront difficult regulatory questions about where and how to draw lines that separate permissible 
and impermissible behavior.” Seth W. Stoughton, The Regulation of Police Violence, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 321, 323 (Roger G. Dunham, Geoffrey P. Alpert & Kyle D. McLean eds., 
8th ed. 2020). In keeping with those concerns, I use “police violence” as a purely descriptive phrase that does 
not connote whether the actions so described were appropriate or inappropriate. I explicitly eschew more value-
loaded terminology, such as “police brutality.” 
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Ironically, though, the Constitution does not actually regulate the use of 
force, at least not directly. The Fourth Amendment regulates seizures, and the 
relationship between seizures and uses of force is more complicated than it first 
appears. An officer seizes someone when the circumstances are such that a 
reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter, either by 
leaving,11 or, in situations where leaving is not feasible, by disregarding the 
officer and going about their business.12 Such circumstances exist when officers 
intentionally acquire a degree of physical control over the subject through the 
subject’s submission to a show of police authority or through the initiation of 
physical contact with the subject.13 Uses of force are regulated as seizures 
because they involve intentional physical contact. 
But not always. Some uses of force are, indeed, seizures. Others are not. This 
Article is the first to point out the extent to which police uses of force are not 
seizures. While Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence can be quite 
sophisticated—or painfully over-complicated, depending on how charitable one 
is feeling—the line between seizures and uses of force has been so badly drawn 
as to have passed the point of absurdity. An officer who shoots at someone, but 
misses, for example, has unquestionably used force, but has not seized the 
subject (unless the subject submits).14 More problematically, appellate courts 
have held that even uses of force that physically connect with someone are not 
necessarily seizures. An officer who shoots someone other than their intended 
target has used force, but may not have seized anyone for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.15 Even when an officer shoots the intended target, courts may 
conclude that there has been no seizure if the subject is able to flee after being 
shot.16 Sometimes even a use of physical force that connects with and has the 
desired effect on the intended target does not constitute a seizure.17 In each of 
these cases, and many more, officers are intentionally using physical force, but 
their actions are not subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. 
When a use of force does constitute a seizure, the Fourth Amendment is a 
distressingly inapt regulatory tool. As Rachel Harmon has observed, 
constitutional jurisprudence “regulating the use of force by police officers is 
 
 11 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 12 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002). 
 13 See, e.g., Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598–99 (1989); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
621, 628–29 (1991). 
 14 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 15 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 16 See infra Part II.A.4. 
 17 See infra Part II.A.3. 
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deeply impoverished.”18 The oft-cited “Graham factors”—the severity of the 
crime, whether the subject is actively resisting or attempting to flee, and whether 
the subject is threatening officers or others—were specifically offered by the 
Court as a guide to judicial evaluation of use-of-force incidents, but those factors 
have limited analytical value.19 At best, they serve as weak and potentially 
misleading proxies for the governmental interests that can justify the use of force 
by police, offering no guidance on what type of force or how much force officers 
can legitimately use in any given situation.20 Worse, although the Graham 
factors were never intended to be exhaustive, courts frequently apply them to 
the exclusion of other relevant considerations. Finally, although the “objective 
reasonableness” inquiry is often conceived of and described as a totality of the 
circumstances review, the Fourth Amendment standard has been applied in ways 
that limit the scope of the analysis. Those limitations consistently favor officers. 
There is a fundamental misalignment between what the Fourth Amendment 
is thought to regulate and what it actually regulates, and there are good reasons 
to doubt the efficacy of that regulation even when it applies. The Fourth 
Amendment, in short, is a profoundly flawed framework for regulating police 
violence. 
The distortive seizure framework of the Fourth Amendment is not the only 
option; sub-constitutional regulatory alternatives exist. State law governs 
tortious and criminal behavior, setting out offenses21 and establishing 
appropriate exceptions,22 including police-specific exceptions. State law, for 
example, could regulate officers’ uses of force qua violence based on its effect 
on public safety. Police agency policy, meanwhile, regulates officer-civilian 
encounters more directly, yet with an eye toward balancing competing police 
priorities, such as the interests in law enforcement, officer safety, and public 
perceptions. Agencies could, as a matter of policy, regulate the use of force as a 
facet of officer interactions. In short, constitutional law, state law, and agency 
policy are not only different sources of authority, they also have distinct 
regulatory goals. As a formal matter, then, there is nothing unusual about the 
assertion that state law or agency policy provide additional layers of regulation, 
such that an officer’s use of force could run afoul of state law or agency policy 
regardless of its constitutional dimensions. 
 
 18 Rachel Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2008). 
 19 See infra Part II.B. 
 20 Harmon, supra note 18, at 1128–47. 
 21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 784.03 (2019). 
 22 Such exceptions include self-defense, defense of others, or defense of property. 
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Despite these divergent regulatory goals, the Fourth Amendment’s flawed 
framework has spilled over into state law and agency policy. A number of state 
judicial decisions reference the constitutional standards when applying or 
interpreting state statutory or common law,23 with some explicitly incorporating 
constitutional jurisprudence into state law.24 And many police agency policies 
borrow heavily or quote directly from Fourth Amendment caselaw, “over-
rely[ing] on reciting the basic constitutional standard for police engagements 
without providing key protections for citizens.”25 
Even when restricted to federal courts,26 the Fourth Amendment’s flaws are 
severe enough to merit reconsideration in light of social and political changes. 
Those flaws are even more serious than they first appear, though, because of the 
spillage of constitutional jurisprudence into state courts’ interpretations of state 
law and police agencies’ development of policy, procedure, and training. In this 
Article, I argue that the many shortcomings in the Fourth Amendment’s 
regulation of police violence make it an inappropriate source of guidance for 
state law and agency policy. While it goes without saying that officers should 
act within the scope of their constitutional authority, state lawmakers and police 
commanders should reject the uncritical adoption of constitutional law as a 
matter of state law or agency policy. 
My argument proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the constitutional 
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of police uses of force under the 
Fourth Amendment. Part II identifies a series of flaws in that framework, adding 
to other scholars’ criticisms to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment’s seizure 
jurisprudence is ill-suited to regulate police uses of force. Part III illustrates the 
problem of constitutional spillage into state law and police agency policy. Part 
IV argues that state legislators, judges, and police commanders should detach 
state law and, to a lesser but appreciable extent, police agency policy from the 
faulty Fourth Amendment framework. By doing so, I hope to advance both 
academic and public conversations about police violence. 
  
 
 23 See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So. 2d 59, 71–72 (Miss. 2005). 
 24 Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000) (“The touchstone of the analysis [for state law 
excessive force claims] is Graham v. Connor.”). 
 25 Osagie K. Obasogie & Zachary Newman, Police Violence, Use of Force Policies, and Public Health, 
43 AM. J.L. & MED. 279, 286–87 (2018). 
 26 See 18 U.S.C. § 242; 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REGULATION OF POLICE VIOLENCE 
Prior to 1989, there was no clearly defined constitutional basis for regulating 
police uses of force. Most excessive force claims brought against state and local 
officers were analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.27 Indeed, the “vast majority” of federal courts had adopted the 
four-part analytical framework articulated by the Second Circuit in Johnson v. 
Glick, under which courts would assess plaintiff’s claims that officers had used 
excessive force by considering: 
[(1)] the need for the application of force, [(2)] the relationship 
between the need and the amount of force that was used, [(3)] the 
extent of injury inflicted, and [(4)] whether force was applied in a good 
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.28 
In 1989, the Supreme Court discarded the substantive due process analysis of 
excessive force claims in the policing context, “reject[ing] the notion that all 
excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic 
standard.”29 Instead, the Court held, excessive force claims were to be governed 
by different generic standards: “in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop 
of a free [i.e., not incarcerated] citizen,” the use of force was to be regulated by 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures.30 
 
 27 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1989). 
 28 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 29 Graham, 490 U.S. at 392. 
 30 Id. at 394. In contrast, the use of force against individuals who have not been seized is regulated by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits government actions that shock the 
conscience. Id. at 393 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). In most use-of-force situations, an 
officer’s use of force will only shock the conscience when it is malicious, motivated by “a purpose to cause harm 
unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest”; conduct that merely evinces deliberate or reckless indifference will 
not run afoul of the Constitution. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998). The use of force 
against pre-trial detainees, meanwhile, is also subject to review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. In that context, however, the jail official’s subjective intention is 
irrelevant; “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was 
objectively unreasonable,” taking into account “the ‘legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need 
to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that 
in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 540, 547 (1979)). The use of force against convicted prisoners, meanwhile, is regulated by the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, which incorporates a subjective analysis: the 
question is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 
(2010). 
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Critically, that decision means that, for constitutional purposes, police uses 
of force are not primarily regulated as violence. Instead, they are regulated as 
seizures. In analyzing claims that officers used excessive force in violation of 
Fourth Amendment rights, then, the first step is to determine whether the 
incident involved a seizure. Less than two months before deciding Graham, the 
Court had clarified the nature of government actions that constitute a seizure, 
holding that seizures “require[] an intentional acquisition of physical control.”31 
In defining the requisite physical control, the Court drew on common law 
tort principles and held that officers can seize individuals in either of two ways. 
First, a seizure occurs when an individual submits to an officer’s “assertion of 
authority” under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free 
to “disregard the police and go about his business.”32 This occurs, for example, 
when an officer initiates a traffic stop by activating their overhead lights (the 
show of authority) and the subject pulls over (submission), because no 
reasonable person in that situation would feel empowered to lawfully disregard 
the officer and keep driving. Second, and more relevantly, “the mere grasping 
or application of physical force with lawful authority” constitutes a seizure 
“whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee.”33 
Despite the general rule that an officer’s subjective motivations are not a 
relevant consideration in Fourth Amendment analysis,34 the Court emphasized 
in Brower v. County of Inyo that what matters in the seizure determination is an 
officer’s intention to restrict freedom of movement.35 As the Court wrote, “a 
Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally 
caused termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the innocent 
passerby), . . . but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of 
 
 31 Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). 
 32 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626–27, 628 (1991). 
 33 Id. at 624. 
 34 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating, “we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth 
Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers” and “[s]ubjective intentions play 
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 
(2006) (concluding, with regard to the constitutionality of searches, “[t]he officer’s subjective motivation is 
irrelevant”); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000) (“The parties properly agree that the subjective 
intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth 
Amendment . . . ; the issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions.”); Graham, 490 U.S. 
at 397 (“[O]ur prior cases make clear” that “the subjective motivations of the individual officers . . . ha[ve] no 
bearing on whether a particular seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (noting an officer’s subjective intent is not 
relevant to the question of whether an individual has been detained); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
236 n.7 (1973) (noting an officer’s subjective perceptions were irrelevant to the determination of the 
constitutionality of a search under the “search incident to arrest” doctrine). 
 35 Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. 
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movement through means intentionally applied.”36 The Court went on to explain 
in dicta that it is the officer’s intention to restrict movement—not the identity of 
the individual whose freedom of movement is actually restricted—that matters, 
writing, “A seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object 
of the detention or taking, . . . but the detention or taking itself must be 
willful.”37 
The Court expounded on this issue in Brendlin v. California, holding that a 
traffic stop involved not only the seizure of the driver—whom the police 
typically target for committing some infraction—but also the seizure of any 
vehicle passengers whom the officer did not specifically target.38 Indeed, the 
Brendlin Court explicitly rejected the argument that “for a specific occupant of 
the car to be seized he must be the motivating target of an officer’s show of 
authority.”39 Instead, the Court reiterated that a seizure is predicated on an 
officer’s intent to restrict some person’s movement, not on whether the person 
whose movement was restricted was the specific individual the officer intended 
to seize.40 Read together, the opinions suggest that so long as officers intend to 
restrict someone’s freedom of movement, the actions that they take that do 
restrict freedom of movement are likely to be considered seizures even if the 
individual whose movement was restricted is not the intended target.41 
If the government action in question amounts to a seizure, the next step is 
analyzing whether it was conducted in compliance with the constitutional 
limitations on government authority. In Graham v. Connor, the Court laid out a 
 
 36 Id. at 59697. 
 37 Id. at 596. 
 38 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
 39 Id. at 261. 
 40 Id. (“[O]ur point was not that Brower alone was the target but that officers detained him ‘through means 
intentionally applied’; if the car had had another occupant, it would have made sense to hold that he too had 
been seized when the car collided with the roadblock.”). 
 41 The “transferred intent” doctrine from criminal law provides a useful parallel. If an actor shoots at 
Person A intending to kill them but misses and fatally hits Person B, toward whom they have no ill will, the 
“transferred intent” doctrine holds that the actor acted with the purpose to kill even though an inadvertent target 
was struck. In essence, the actor’s mens rea is said to “transfer” from the intended target to the unintended target. 
The doctrine of transferred intent has been subject to a range of criticisms, from assertions that it is an 
unnecessary legal fiction, see JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL 
LAW 156–58 (6th ed. 2012); to assertions that it is misguided, see Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 
NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 65 (1996); to far stronger denunciations of the doctrine, see Peter 
Westen, The Significance of Transferred Intent, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 321, 322 (2013). Criminal law theorists have 
disputed the propriety of transferred intent, variously arguing that it imposes liability on non-culpable (or less 
culpable) actors, see Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of Criminal Culpability, 
1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 501 (1998), and that it should be abandoned in favor of alternative means of reaching 
substantially similar outcomes. See Husak, supra. 
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framework for evaluating seizures involving or predicated on the application of 
physical force: because the applicable constitutional language prohibits 
unreasonable seizures, the ultimate question is whether the officer’s actions were 
“objectively reasonable” under the circumstances.42 Answering that question, 
the Court wrote, requires “a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s . . . interests’ against the countervailing 
governmental interests at stake.”43 But the balancing “test of reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical 
application.”44 Instead, determining whether any given use of force was 
constitutionally reasonable requires “careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case.”45 The Court identified three specific, but 
not exclusive or exhaustive, considerations that are particularly relevant: (1) ”the 
severity of the crime at issue,” (2) ”whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) ”whether [the suspect] is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”46 These 
considerations are commonly known as the “Graham factors.” 
Of course, the underlying facts and circumstances are subject to dispute; 
there is always the potential for both factual and interpretive disagreements. As 
a factual matter, there may be a disagreement about whether the subject took a 
step toward an officer or whether the officer struck the subject with a closed fist. 
As an interpretive matter, there may be a disagreement about how undisputed 
facts should be interpreted; even when there is factual agreement that the subject 
took a step toward the officer, for example, there may be interpretive 
disagreement about whether the subject did so aggressively or in a way that 
threatened the officer. The determination that an officer’s use of force was 
objectively reasonable vel non will depend on what one understands the 
operative facts and circumstances to be.47 So how should the facts and 
circumstances be identified? Here, too, the Court has provided guidance, 
instructing reviewers to adopt the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than . . . the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”48 
 
 42 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
 43 Id. at 396. 
 44 Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Individual perceptions and conclusions may be influenced by the reviewer’s prior beliefs, including 
their attitudes about police. Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Body Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 
125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1318–22 (2016); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 
8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 408 (2013); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and 
Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006). 
 48 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
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Thus, the formula for determining the reasonableness of an officer’s use of 
force is not fully subjective: courts should not blindly accept the facts or 
circumstances that the officer perceived or the conclusions that the officer drew. 
Nor is the test fully objective: courts will not eschew consideration of the 
officer’s subjective perceptions. Instead, the constitutionality of police violence 
is determined under a more nuanced and complex standard, one that has been 
referred to as “subjective objectivity.”49 In assessing the constitutionality of 
force, the officer’s subjective perspective, observations, and conclusions must 
be filtered through the lens of the legal construct known as the “reasonable 
officer on the scene.”50 The operative facts and circumstances are those that the 
“reasonable officer” would have perceived, and the operative conclusions are 
those that the “reasonable officer” would have come to if she had been in the 
position of the actual officer at the time.51 
Once the operative facts and circumstances—that is, the facts as they would 
have appeared to a reasonable officer at the time—have been identified, the 
analysis turns to the ultimate question: under those facts and circumstances, was 
the use of force objectively reasonable? Unfortunately, while the Court has 
provided a multifaceted framework for determining what the operative “facts 
and circumstances” are, it has done little to provide meaningful guidance to 
courts assessing the reasonableness of police violence. In short, the Court has 
not explained how to distinguish reasonable force from unreasonable force. It 
did, however, caution that the analysis must be deferential to officers: “The 
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that 
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.”52 
The Court has suggested that the question of reasonableness is essentially 
one of proportionality, at least in the context of deadly force. In 1985, four years 
before Graham was decided, the Court articulated the circumstances under 
which officers could constitutionally use deadly force, concluding that the 
Fourth Amendment permits it when officers have “probable cause to believe that 
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the 
officer or others.”53 In so holding, the Court rejected a common law rule known 
 
 49 Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 481, 486 (1994). 
 50 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 396–97. 
 53 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985). 
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as the “fleeing felon rule,” which held that officers could use deadly force to 
prevent the escape of a fleeing felon.54 The Court’s decision was explicitly 
predicated on the strength of the individual’s interest in not being killed, and on 
the relative weakness of the government’s interest in killing a fleeing felony 
suspect: doing so would undermine, rather than facilitate, the government’s 
interest in apprehending the offender, determining guilt, and imposing 
punishment, and it would not meaningfully advance the government’s interest 
in law enforcement by discouraging other suspects from fleeing.55 
The rule governing deadly force in the aftermath of Garner appeared fairly 
straightforward: lower courts and police agencies themselves understood that 
deadly force was a proportional response to an immediate threat of death or great 
bodily harm, but was disproportionate to any lesser or more attenuated threat. 
That bright-line rule lasted for almost twenty years before being muddied by the 
Court’s 2007 decision in Scott v. Harris.56 In that case, the Court reimagined the 
Garner holding, writing, “Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that 
triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute ‘deadly 
force.’ Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s 
‘reasonableness’ test . . . to the use of a particular type of force in a particular 
situation.”57 Instead of setting out the circumstances in which deadly force is 
constitutionally permissible, which is how Garner had been interpreted until that 
point, the Harris Court understood Garner to be an application of Graham’s 
reasonableness test.58 Harris, in short, strongly suggests that there is no 
meaningful difference between deadly force and less-lethal force: “all that 
matters is whether [the officer’s] actions were reasonable.”59 
Strong as that suggestion is, it is not entirely clear how seriously it should be 
taken in light of the fact that Harris appears to have followed the Garner rule. 
In Harris, an officer used his vehicle to ram a fleeing motorist, causing the 
 
 54 Id. at 12. 
 55 Id. at 10–12. This portion of the Court’s holding was based, to a significant extent, on a review of 
contemporary police practices as reflected in the policies of forty-six police agencies, including the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the New York City Police Department; research by the Boston Police Department 
Planning and Research Division and by the International Association of Chiefs of Police; and the accreditation 
criteria set out by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. See Brandon Garrett & Seth 
Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 224–28 (2017). 
 56 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 57 Id. at 382. 
 58 The Harris Court appears to have encountered a Star Trek-esque hole in the space-time continuum, 
given that it was, in 2007, interpreting Garner, written in 1985, to be an example of Graham, decided in 1989. 
Id. 
 59 Harris, 550 U.S. at 383. 
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fleeing vehicle to go into an uncontrolled spin and crash.60 The Court described 
the events leading up to the ram as “a dangerous high-speed car chase that 
threaten[ed] the lives of innocent bystanders . . . .”61 Indeed, the Court held that 
it was so clear that the fleeing motorist “posed a substantial and immediate risk 
of serious physical injury to others” that “no reasonable jury could conclude 
otherwise.”62 Given this interpretation of the facts, it would appear that the 
officer in Harris had probable cause to believe that the fleeing driver presented 
an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to the officer or others, and 
therefore would have been justified in using deadly force under Garner. After 
Harris, it seems clear that it is objectively reasonable for officers to use deadly 
force when they are confronted with an imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily injury, but Harris appears to have left open the possibility that it may be 
objectively reasonable for officers to use deadly force in other circumstances as 
well. 
Harris is not without its critics. A prominent criminologist with an extensive 
background in studying police pursuits argued, inter alia, that the Harris 
decision failed to acknowledge relevant research that would have 
contraindicated the Court’s conclusions.63 At least one legal scholar has argued 
that outside of the relatively limited contexts of vehicle pursuits, Harris is 
something of a dead letter, largely ignored by lower courts and even, in its 
subsequent decisions, the Court itself.64 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment regulates police violence (when it amounts 
to a seizure) by requiring, under a deferential view of the facts and circumstances 
and keeping certain especially relevant factors in mind, officers’ actions to be 
objectively reasonable. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT FLAWS 
The preceding Part described the Fourth Amendment’s regulation of police 
violence as seizures. In this Part, I identify four structural shortcomings in that 
approach. First, there are significant interstices between “uses of force” and 
“seizures.” Because the terms are not coextensive, some acts of police violence 
 
 60 Id. at 375. 
 61 Id. at 373. 
 62 Id. at 386. For an empirical examination of this assertion, see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & 
Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). 
 63 Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, Police Pursuits After Scott v. Harris, 10 POLICE FOUND. 1, 12 
(2008). 
 64 RACHEL A. HARMON, THE LAW OF THE POLICE (forthcoming 2021). 
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simply will not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Second, when the Fourth 
Amendment does apply, the framework articulated by the Court is deeply 
flawed. The factors the Court explicitly identified as particularly relevant to 
determining whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable are at best 
unhelpful and at worst affirmatively misleading. Third, while the Court has 
articulated a “totality of the circumstances” approach in theory, the approach in 
practice has been sharply limited. Courts frequently rely on some circumstances 
while largely eschewing others, often in ways that systematically benefit 
officers. Fourth, the language used to describe when the Constitution permits the 
use of force has been sloppily inconsistent, frustrating efforts to carefully parse 
the Court’s opinions to define meaning, as is common in other Fourth 
Amendment contexts. The cracks, inadequacies, and incompleteness inherent in 
the constitutional framework make the Fourth Amendment a flawed vehicle 
indeed for regulating police violence. 
A. Nothing to Seize Here: When Police Uses of Force ≠ Seizures 
The Fourth Amendment regulates seizures.65 Uses of force that do not 
amount to seizures, for constitutional purposes, are outside the ambit of the 
Fourth Amendment. So much is obvious. What is less obvious, however, is the 
sheer number and width of the interstices between seizures and police violence. 
Various federal courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not reach 
unsuccessful attempts to use of force, or uses of force that connect with an 
unintended target, or uses of force that connect with the intended target but are 
not intended to restrain freedom of movement, or uses of force that connect with 
the intended target and are intended to restrain but fail to do so. The following 
subsections examine each scenario, illustrating the discrepancies between police 
violence and seizures. 
The various gaps discussed in this section should not be read as a 
condemnation of how courts are applying seizure jurisprudence. Instead, the 
inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment to many situations involving police 
violence is more properly understood as an indication that the rules developed 
to regulate seizures are not conceptually well aligned to regulate police violence. 
Some of these conclusions, for example, may make perfect sense in the context 
of investigative stops66 or arrests but little sense when it comes to police uses of 
 
 65 The Fourth Amendment, of course, also regulates searches. A tremendous amount of ink has been 
spilled by judges and scholars applying or examining the constitutional regulation of searches. As interesting 
and important as that convoluted set of issues is, I am delighted that it is outside the scope of this Article and 
need not be discussed further. 
 66 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (authorizing officers who have reasonable suspicion to believe 
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force. That conclusion advances my ultimate thesis: the Fourth Amendment is 
not well calibrated for regulating police violence. 
1. Attempts to Use Physical Force that Fail to Connect 
As described above, a seizure requires governmental action intended to 
restrain liberty and either physical contact or the subject’s submission to an 
officer’s assertion of authority. An officer may intend to restrain someone, but 
if their use of force is unsuccessful because the officer failed to make physical 
contact with a non-compliant subject, the officer has achieved neither physical 
contact nor the subject’s submission. Under such circumstances, courts have 
held unsuccessful attempts to use force do not constitute Fourth Amendment 
seizures. 
Consider the case of Christopher Reed, who was attacked by a group of 
heavily intoxicated assailants outside of an Orlando nightclub.67 He managed to 
escape to a nearby parking lot and get into his car.68 As Reed drove away, he 
struck several of the assailants who were surrounding the vehicle.69 When 
Officer Phillip Clough saw what Reed had done, he fired two shots at Reed’s 
vehicle.70 “Reed neither heard nor saw the shots.”71 Reed was later stopped by 
the police, at which time he learned that officers had (previously) shot at him.72 
Reed filed a § 1983 claim alleging, inter alia, that Officer Clough’s use of deadly 
force violated the Fourth Amendment.73 The district court granted the defense 
motion for summary judgment and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding 
that there was no valid basis for a Fourth Amendment claim because Reed had 
not been seized.74 There was no evidence that Officer Clough’s gunshots had 
struck Reed’s vehicle, so there was no physical contact.75 Further, “the 
undisputed evidence that Reed did not learn about Clough’s gunshots until he 
was later stopped by police demonstrated that Reed was not seized within the 
 
that crime is afoot to initiate brief detentions for the purposes of confirming or dispelling their suspicions, and 
authorizing officers who have reasonable suspicion that a detained subject is armed and dangerous to conduct a 
limited search for weapons by patting down the exterior of the subject’s clothing). 
 67 Reed v. Clough, 694 F. App’x 716, 717 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 68 Id. at 718. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 717. 
 72 Id. at 724. 
 73 Id. at 717. 
 74 Id. at 724. 
 75 Id. The complaint alleged that Officer Clough’s shots had broken Reed’s windshield and that the broken 
glass had injured Reed, but there was no evidence in the record to support that contention. Instead, the evidence 
suggested that Reed’s window was broken later (by an officer wielding a baton). Id. 
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment” because, from Reed’s perspective, there 
was no show of authority.76 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Officer 
Clough had shot at Reed in an attempt to effect what would have amounted to a 
Fourth Amendment seizure,77 but—quoting a prior circuit case that, in turn, 
quoted Hodari D.—it reiterated, “Neither usage nor common-law tradition 
makes an attempted seizure a seizure.”78 
It is not uncommon for officers to unsuccessfully attempt to use force. 
Officers get more hours of training on firearms than any other single tool, 
technique, or weapon that they might use in use-of-force situations, yet the best 
available data suggests that in most situations officers miss their target more 
often than they hit.79 Officers also employ less-lethal80 projectile weapons (e.g., 
beanbag and “baton” rounds, chemical sprays, PepperBalls, and TASERs),81 
handheld weapons (e.g., batons), and bodily weapons (e.g., fists), and, as with 
firearms, they fail to hit their targets on at least some occasions. When they miss, 
those uses of force will not constitute seizures and are likely to fall outside the 
ambit of the Fourth Amendment.82 
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 726. 
 78 Id. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit came to a similar conclusion regarding 
a vehicle pursuit and multiple shots fired at a subject. In that case, the court held that the subject was not seized 
until actually struck by the officer’s bullets, concluding that previous shots “that were fired at [the subject’s 
vehicle] and that did not hit [the subject] were not seizures because they [like a vehicle pursuit itself] failed to 
produce a stop.” Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 79 Christopher M. Donner & Nicole Popovich, Hitting (or Missing) the Mark: An Examination of Police 
Shooting Accuracy in Officer-Involved Shooting Incidents, 42 POLICING: AN INT’L J. 474, 474–75, 479 (2019) 
(concluding that Dallas Police Department officers hit their target, on average, 35% of the time); BERNARD D. 
ROSTKER, LAWRENCE M. HANSER, WILLIAM M. HIX, CARL JENSEN, ANDREW R. MORRAL, GREG RIDGEWAY & 
TERRY L. SCHELL, EVALUATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT FIREARM TRAINING AND 
FIREARM-DISCHARGE REVIEW PROCESS 14–15 (2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/ 
public_information/RAND_FirearmEvaluation.pdf (concluding that New York Police Department officers hit 
their target with between 18% and 37% of the bullets fired, depending on the nature of the shooting); CHARLIE 
BECK, USE OF FORCE YEAR-END REVIEW 29 (2016), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/2016-use-of-force-
year-end-review-small.pdf (concluding that Los Angeles Police Department officers hit their target with between 
20% and 48% of the bullets fired, depending on year); Michael D. White, Hitting the Target (or Not): Comparing 
Characteristics of Fatal, Injurious, and Noninjurious Police Shootings, 9 POLICE Q. 303, 304 (2006). 
 80 I adopt here the industry standard terminology for a force option that can, but is not substantially likely 
to, cause serious bodily injury or death. See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 81 In their standard deployment mode, a TASER weapon will propel two darts, called “probes.” The 
maximum range depends on the cartridge being used, but can extend to thirty-five feet. See ROSTKER ET AL., 
supra note 79. 
 82 Unless, of course, the unsuccessful use of force convinces the subject to submit to the officer’s show 
of authority. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626–27, 628 (1991). 
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2. Physical Contact with an Unintended Person 
Sometimes an officer’s use of force will physically connect with someone 
other than the intended target. It would be easy to assume that, under such 
circumstances, the unintended recipient of an officer’s use of force has been 
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, especially since the Court suggested as 
much in both Brower and Brendlin. 
In the use of force context, however, several courts have adopted an 
approach that is in tension, if not entirely inconsistent, with the language of 
Brower and Brendlin. Multiple federal courts—including the Courts of Appeal 
for the First,83 Second,84 Fourth,85 Sixth,86 Seventh,87 and Tenth Circuits88—
have held that an individual is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes only when 
he is the intended target of the use of force. Under that approach, a use of force 
that inadvertently affects an innocent bystander does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment seizure. 
Claybrook v. Birchwell is representative; an officer intentionally fired his 
weapon at someone, but the bullet missed the intended target and struck 
Quintana Claybrook in the back, seriously injuring her.89 Claybrook brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.90 The Sixth 
Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable when “physical 
injuries [were] inadvertently inflicted upon an innocent third party . . . because 
the authorities could not ‘seize’ any person other than one who was a deliberate 
object of their exertion of force.”91 
Ironically, the Sixth Circuit cited as support for that proposition the same 
page of the Brower opinion that states, “A seizure occurs even when an 
unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking.”92 
Nevertheless, the court held the Fourth Amendment inapplicable, writing, 
“constitutional tort claims asserted by persons collaterally injured by police 
 
 83 E.g., Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795, 798 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 84 E.g., Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 85 E.g., Rucker v. Harford Cnty., 946 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1991); see Lee v. Williams, 138 F. Supp. 2d 
748, 758 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 86 E.g., Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 87 E.g., Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2003); see Bean v. Ind. Univ., 855 F. Supp. 2d 857, 
864–65 (S.D. Ind. 2012). 
 88 E.g., Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 89 Claybrook, 199 F.3d at 355. 
 90 Id. at 353. 
 91 Id. at 359 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). 
 92 Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
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conduct who were not intended targets of an attempted official ‘seizure’ are 
adjudged according to substantive due process norms.”93 Other courts have 
come to similar conclusions in cases involving bystanders or unintended targets 
struck by stray bullets.94 
Officer-involved shootings are not the only use of force that can affect an 
unintended target. In Sebastian v. Douglas County, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado ruled on a § 1983 claim predicated on an alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation.95 In that case, two suspects fled from a traffic stop and climbed a 
fence.96 Deputy Greg Black released a police canine that had been trained in 
what the court referred to as a “find-and-bite” tactic97—often referred to as “bite-
and-hold”—in which the canine is trained to bite the target and maintain that 
bite until the handler gives the order to release the bite.98 Instead of following 
the two suspects over the fence, however, the canine returned to the vehicle and 
bit Fabian Sebastian, a passenger in the back of the vehicle who was in his seat 
with his hands up, exactly what the officers had directed him to do.99 The 
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Sebastian’s allegation with regard to 
Deputy Black was that the deputy had directed the dog to bite the fleeing 
suspects, not Sebastian himself.100 That allegation, the court held, “does not 
amount to an allegation that the seizure here was the product of ‘means 
intentionally applied’ under Brower.”101 
There are also at least some situations where officers’ use of force impacts 
both the intended target and an unintended target. In Bublitz v. Cottey, for 
example, officers were engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a robbery suspect.102 
Sergeant David Durant deployed a spike strip to deflate the tires of the fleeing 
vehicle.103 When the suspect drove over the spike strip, their car veered to the 
 
 93 Id. The substantive due process framework is discussed briefly above. See supra note 30. 
 94 Moore v. Weekly, 159 F. Supp. 3d 784, 791 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (minor child accidentally shot during a 
police raid); Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 2000) (hostages in a fleeing minivan 
shot by officers were not seized because officers “intended to restrain the minivan and the fugitives, not [the 
hostages]”); Browell v. Davidson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911–12 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (kidnapping victim accidentally 
shot by officers); Green v. Freeman, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (bank robbery victim 
accidentally shot by officers). 
 95 Sebastian v. Douglas Cnty., 366 P.3d 601, 605 (Colo. 2016). 
 96 Id. at 603–04. 
 97 Id. at 604. 
 98 SETH W. STOUGHTON, JEFFREY J. NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE 
220–21 (2020). 
 99 Sebastian, 355 P.3d at 604. 
 100 Id. at 607. 
 101 Id. (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989)). 
 102 Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 103 Id. 
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side and crashed into a vehicle that had not been involved in the pursuit, injuring 
Lester Bublitz and killing his wife, Rebekah, and son, Nathaniel.104 The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that while the officers intentionally made physical contact 
with the fleeing suspect’s vehicle in an attempt to apprehend the robbery suspect, 
“[t]he Bublitz family was simply not the intended object of the defendant 
officers’ attempts to seize the fleeing [suspect], so the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated and cannot provide the basis for a section 1983 claim.”105 
As those cases demonstrate, an intentional use of force that impacts someone 
other than the intended target—even if it also affects the intended target—may 
not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
3. Physical Contact without the Intent to Restrain 
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court stated that a seizure occurs “whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.”106 In use-
of-force situations as they are typically conceived, officers use physical violence 
as a tool to restrain a subject’s ability to move and act freely, either for the 
purposes of detaining or arresting someone, or to protect themselves, another 
person, or the subject. On some occasions, however, officers use force to get 
someone moving, rather than with the intention of preventing someone from 
moving. 
In the context of crowd control, for example, officers can deploy a range of 
physical weapons—disruptive devices,107 chemical munitions,108 less-lethal 
projectiles,109 electrical conductive weapons,110 and so on—to enforce dispersal 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 489. 
 106 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
 107 Officers responding to the unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, deployed noise-flash diversionary devices, 
better known by their colloquial name “flashbangs.” Abbie Nehring, “Less Lethal” Flash-Bangs Used in 
Ferguson Leave Some Feeling the Burn, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 22, 2014, 9:56 AM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/less-lethal-flash-bangs-used-in-ferguson-leave-some-feeling-the-burn. The Seattle Police Department 
uses Blast Balls in crowd control situations. Paula Wissel, Seattle Police Say “Blast Balls” Safer Than Other 
Methods of Crowd Control, KNKX (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.knkx.org/post/seattle-police-say-blast-balls-
safer-other-methods-crowd-control. 
 108 Officers may use conventional pepper spray, of course, but may also deploy smoke or chemical gas 
from launched or thrown grenades. Alyssa Fowers, Aaron Steckelberg & Bonnie Berkowitz, A Guide to the 
Less-Lethal Weapons That Law Enforcement Uses Against Protesters, WASH. POST (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/05/less-lethal-weapons-protests/?arc404 =true. 
 109 This includes rubber bullets, beanbags fired from a shotgun, and pellets fired from a PepperBall rifle. 
Id. 
 110 Agencies have deployed stun batons, stun shields, and handheld electrical conductive weapons that 
resemble a “bunny-ear” antenna that can be used against individual protestors in a crowd situation. Paul A. 
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orders. Such tools and weapons are used to clear people from the area—the 
violent police equivalent of “you don’t have to go home, but you can’t stay 
here.” It seems possible to argue that, under such circumstances, individual 
crowd members’ freedom of movement is being restrained not because they are 
restricted in their ability to leave, but because they are being denied the option 
to stay in place. As previous work in this area has described, however, “Brower 
and similar formulations of seizure can be read to indicate that where one avenue 
of movement is denied to a citizen, she is not seized, but where all avenues of 
movement are denied to her, she is.”111 In short, even assuming that any 
particular member of the crowd would be considered an “intended” target, for 
the reasons discussed above,112 it is not at all clear that the use of force to 
encourage movement, as opposed to limit the subject’s physical ability to move, 
would constitute a seizure. 
Other contexts present the same conundrum more directly. When activist 
Martin O’Boyle was attempting to take air samples at the office of the town clerk 
in Gulf Stream, Florida, he refused to let Police Chief Garrett Ward make a copy 
of a document that purportedly allowed him to record video in public 
buildings.113 “Chief Ward allegedly grabbed O’Boyle’s ‘right-hand wrist and 
forearm to prevent [him] from retrieving the document’” that he was making a 
copy of and “shoved [O’Boyle] with his whole body” before grabbing his “right 
wrist and elbow with both hands and forcibly eject[ing O’Boyle] from the copy 
machine area” and warning him to leave the building.114 The Eleventh Circuit 
approached the Fourth Amendment issue by asserting that the “ultimate inquiry 
[was] whether the officer used force as a means of coercion that would make 
[the plaintiff] feel he was not free to leave.”115 With that in mind, and 
“[c]onstruing the facts in a light most favorable to O’Boyle,” the Court wrote, 
“we simply do not see how a reasonable person in O’Boyle’s position would not 
have believed that he was free to leave at any time”116 because, as the complaint 
itself admitted, “Chief Ward’s actions were done in an attempt to ‘eject’ 
 
Haskins, Conducted Energy Devices: Policies on Use Evolve to Reflect Research and Field Deployment 
Experience, 281 NAT’L INST. JUST. 45, 51, 53 n.17 (2019). 
 111 Renée Paradis, Note, Carpe Demonstratores: Towards a Bright-Line Rule Governing Seizure in 
Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 316, 317 (2003); see Karen J. Pita 
Loor, Tear Gas + Water Hoses + Dispersal Orders: The Fourth Amendment Endorses Brutality in Protest 
Policing, 100 B.U. L. REV. 817, 838–41 (2020). 
 112 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 113 O’Boyle v. Thrasher, 638 F. App’x 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 114 Id. at 875–76. 
 115 Id. at 877 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 116 Id. 
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O’Boyle.”117 Because O’Boyle was “free to walk away or end the encounter and 
proceed about his business,” he was not seized for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.118 
Not every such case involves an individual being ejected from a particular 
area. In Clark v. Edmunds, a county sheriff, David Edmunds, was at Sheryl 
Clark’s house to take Clark’s adult daughter into custody for an involuntary 
mental health evaluation.119 Sheriff Edmunds grabbed the daughter’s arm and 
began escorting her out of the house when Clark, who was nearby, “turned to 
see what was happening.”120 Fearing an attack, the sheriff shoved Clark away, 
causing her to stumble backward and strike a chair and glass table.121 Sheriff 
Edmunds clearly intended to make physical contact, and he made physical 
contact with the intended target, and his use of force had the desired effect of 
controlling, to some extent, Clark’s movement, but the Tenth Circuit still 
concluded that the shove did not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.122 It came to that decision because “[t]he sheriff only intended to 
remove Plaintiff from his path to the door; he did not intend to acquire physical 
control over her.”123 Although Sheriff Edmunds was intentionally exercising a 
degree of physical control over Clark’s physical movements by removing her 
from his path, the fact that he was stopping her from moving in one particular 
way—coming closer—rather than trying to restrict her freedom of movement 
generally was sufficient for the court to hold that his use of force did not amount 
to a seizure.124 
4. Physical Contact that Fails to Restrain 
There is a degree of tension about whether and for how long someone’s 
movements must actually be restricted to constitute a seizure. On the one hand, 
dictum from Hodari D. suggests that “the mere grasping or application of 
physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the 
arrestee, was sufficient” to constitute a seizure.125 Elsewhere in that opinion, the 
Court wrote, “The word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on of 
hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is 
 
 117 Id. at 878. 
 118 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 119 Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1221–22. 
 123 Id. at 1222. 
 124 Id. at 1221–22. 
 125 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). 
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ultimately unsuccessful.”126 A subject who escapes despite an officer’s use of 
physical force may not remain seized, the Court acknowledged, but the subject 
would still have been seized at the time of the force itself.127 
On the other hand, the Court seemed to suggest a more limited definition in 
other cases. In Brower, the Court referred to “governmentally caused 
termination of an individual’s freedom of movement.”128 In Terry v. Ohio, the 
Court wrote that the Fourth Amendment applies when officers have “in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen.”129 In United States v. Mendenhall, the 
Court wrote that “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or 
a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.”130 In Brower, 
Terry, and Mendenhall, of course, there was no question of whether the subject’s 
movement had been restrained; instead, the issue was whether the restraint was 
or needed to be intentional,131 whether the restraint was constitutional in the 
absence of probable cause,132 or whether the restraint was the result of the 
subject’s consent.133 Nevertheless, some courts have read into Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence a requirement that, to constitute a seizure, a 
governmental action must actually result in the restraint or termination of an 
individual’s movement. 
This has obvious implications in the use-of-force context. On some number 
of occasions, officers will use physical force against an intended target with the 
goal of restricting the target’s freedom of movement, but the subject will still be 
able to evade apprehension. The Seventh Circuit,134 Ninth Circuit,135 and Tenth 
Circuit136 have all held that there is no seizure under such circumstances.137 
 
 126 Id. at 626. 
 127 Id. at 625 (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 471 (1874) (“A seizure is a single act, and not a 
continuous fact[.]”)). Courts applying this approach have held that an officer’s use of physical force against a 
subject amounts to a seizure even if the subject is able to flee. See, e.g., Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1268 
(11th Cir. 2003) (noting that an individual who fled after being shot by an officer was seized despite not being 
“stopped by the bullet”). 
 128 Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989). 
 129 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
 130 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). 
 131 Brower, 489 U.S. at 596. 
 132 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. 
 133 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557. 
 134 United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating, to constitute a seizure, “the show 
of authority or use of force must have caused the fleeing individual to stop attempting to escape”). 
 135 United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A seizure does not occur if an officer 
applies physical force in an attempt to detain a suspect but such force is ineffective.”). 
 136 Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 137 But see United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] seizure is effected by even the 
slightest application of physical force[;] it is immaterial whether the suspect yields to that force.” (internal 
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In Brooks v. Gaenzle, for example, deputies responding to a call about a 
residential burglary were fired upon by an unknown assailant.138 As deputies 
withdrew and regrouped, Keith Brooks fled from the back of the house and 
began climbing a fence.139 Deputy Gaenzle fired his weapon, striking Brooks.140 
Despite having been shot, Brooks was able to escape over the fence, made it to 
a nearby vehicle, and evaded apprehension for the next three days.141 Brooks 
ultimately filed a lawsuit alleging that Deputy Gaenzle’s use of force violated 
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.142 The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that there had been no seizure; while “Deputy Gaenzle’s 
gunshot may have intentionally struck Mr. Brooks[,] it clearly did not terminate 
his movement or otherwise cause the government to have physical control over 
him.”143 In the absence of a governmentally imposed termination of movement, 
the court held, there could be no seizure.144 
That logic has not been restricted to cases in which officers used deadly 
force. In United States v. Hernandez, officers approached James Hernandez to 
conduct a Terry stop after seeing him climb a fence.145 Hernandez attempted to 
flee, Officer Gregory Sadar grabbed him, “and a brief struggle ensued” before 
Hernandez ultimately broke away and fled on foot.146 While fleeing, Hernandez 
discarded a firearm that he was later charged with possessing unlawfully.147 
Hernandez sought to have the firearm suppressed, contending that the evidence 
was fruit of an unlawful seizure because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion 
to justify the initiation encounter.148 The Ninth Circuit focused on Hernandez’s 
escape, writing, “[Officer] Sadar did have physical contact with Hernandez 
during a brief struggle, but obviously, this force was insufficient to impede 
Hernandez because he fled.”149 Because Hernandez did not submit to the 
officer’s verbal commands and, more relevantly, because he was not “physically 
subdued” by the officer’s use of force, the court held that he was never seized 
 
quotation marks omitted)); Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 471 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A] seizure occurs when 
either the citizen submits to an assertion of authority or physical force is applied, regardless of whether the 
citizen yields to that force.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 138 614 F.3d at 1215. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 1216. 
 143 Id. at 1224–25. 
 144 Id. at 1220, 1224. 
 145 27 F.3d 1403,1404–05 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 146 Id. at 1405. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 1407. 
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for Fourth Amendment purposes.150 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
came to substantially the same conclusion in a similar case.151 
Physical force that has been employed to restrict the target’s freedom of 
movement and that connects with, but does not restrain, the intended target may 
not be considered a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. This logic has not 
been universally adopted; the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held 
that the use of physical force is a seizure without regard to the subject’s 
evasion.152 In December 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Torres v. 
Madrid to resolve the circuit split on exactly this issue.153 
B. Crumbling Graham Factors 
The prior subsection illustrated the limited reach of the Fourth Amendment 
when it comes to police uses of force by exploring the ways in which officers 
can use physical force without effecting a seizure. This subsection makes a 
different point: even when the Fourth Amendment does apply, it can be a 
distressingly inapt regulatory mechanism. As Rachel Harmon has pointed out, 
the current constitutional framework for evaluating police violence is “deeply 
impoverished.”154 The Fourth Amendment’s regulatory shortcomings are, at 
least in part, the result of the emphasis that the Court put on—and that lower 
courts and others have read into—the so-called Graham factors. 
According to Graham, determining whether an officer’s use of force was 
objectively reasonable “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances 
of each particular case.”155 The Court specifically identified three factors, 
suggesting they are especially relevant to the analysis: “[(1)] the severity of the 
crime at issue, [(2)] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 
of the officers or others, and [(3)] whether [the suspect] is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”156 Lower courts quote these 
considerations as a matter of course, but building on Harmon’s work, this 
subsection illustrates why the Graham factors too often crumble under the 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Henson v. United States, 55 A.3d 859, 866–67 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 152 See, e.g., Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 471 (8th Cir. 1995); Nelson v. City of Davis, 685 F.3d 
867, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2012); Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 153 For purposes of full disclosure, I am one of the signatories on an amicus curiae brief supporting the 
petition for certiorari and another arguing that the use of force against a subject should be considered a seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes even if the subject evades apprehension. 
 154 See Harmon, supra note 18, at 1119. 
 155 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 156 Id. 
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weight put on them. First, the Graham factors are often of limited analytical 
import and can affirmatively hinder accurate analysis when taken at face value. 
Second, the Court has failed to provide operational definitions that can be 
applied by officers or reviewers, introducing potential confusion about what 
exactly the various Graham factors mean and how they apply. Third, although 
not intended to be exhaustive, the special emphasis that is often placed on the 
Graham factors creates a risk that other relevant considerations will either be 
overlooked or undervalued. 
1. Analytical Red Herrings 
In a seminal article, Harmon persuasively argued that Graham failed to 
provide an appropriately rigorous analytical framework in use-of-force cases, 
providing little, if any, guidance as to a series of critical questions:157 what 
government interests justify the use of force? How should courts determine 
whether one (or more) of those government interests existed, or the strength of 
the interest(s) in any given case? How should courts weigh those interests 
against the individual interest in liberty and bodily integrity to determine 
whether force was reasonable? As Harmon observed, “Graham has largely left 
judges and juries to their intuitions, and what direction it does give sometimes 
steers them off course.”158 If anything, her assessment was too forgiving. 
Perhaps the Court knowingly left the governing standards vague, trusting lower 
courts and individual police agencies to interpret and further refine them.159 If 
so, that has proven to be a failed experiment in analytical delegation. 
Officers cannot use force for no reason or any reason. Harmon identified 
three prospective government interests, a threat to any of which can, under 
appropriate circumstances, justify the use of force: law enforcement (e.g., 
apprehending suspected criminal offenders), public order (e.g., protecting public 
safety), and officer safety (i.e., protecting officers).160 At best, the Graham 
factors can help answer the relatively straightforward question of whether there 
is a legitimate threat to a government interest. A subject’s suspected commission 
of a crime can implicate the government’s interest in law enforcement, for 
example, which can justify an officer’s use of force. 
 
 157 Harmon, supra note 18, at 1129–30. 
 158 Id. at 1130. 
 159 See, e.g., John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 256 
(2015). 
 160 Id. at 1151–56; see STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98. 
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Except that is not quite right. The fact that a crime was committed—or, more 
accurately, that there is at least probable cause to believe a particular person 
committed a crime—establishes that the government has a legitimate interest in 
apprehending the suspected offender.161 But it is not the government interest in 
law enforcement that justifies the use of force; instead, as Harmon points out, 
only a threat to a government interest can justify the use of force.162 Even when 
the government has a legitimate interest in apprehension, for example, the use 
of force is generally inappropriate when an arrestee compliantly submits to 
arrest, as most do.163 The same logic applies when the government has an interest 
in public order and officer safety, but those interests are not threatened by the 
subject’s actions. 
The first Graham factor—the severity of the crime—does not establish the 
existence of a threat to the government interest’s in law enforcement, nor does 
it help assess the severity of such a threat.164 Although it refers to the severity of 
the crime, the first Graham factor is more related to the government’s interests 
in public and officer safety than it is to the government’s interest in 
apprehending suspected offenders. In the absence of more detailed information, 
it seems entirely reasonable to conclude that a bank robbery suspect is more 
 
 161 Some scholars have argued that the severity of the crime may affect the first-order question of whether 
there is a government interest in effecting an arrest. Ian Ayres and Daniel Markovits, for example, have argued 
that the government’s interest in seizing individuals suspected of committing minor crimes is too weak to justify 
a use of force. Ian Ayres & Daniel Markovits, Ending Excessive Police Force Starts with New Rules of 
Engagement, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ending-excessive-
police-force-starts-with-new-rules-of-engagement/2014/12/25/7fa379c0-8a1e-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58_story. 
html. Rachel Harmon has also called into question the strength of the government’s interest in making custodial 
arrests for low-level offenses. Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV., 307, 360 (2016). That 
question, though, is distinct from the issue I examine here: Whether the severity of a crime is probative of the 
existence of a threat to a government interest. 
 162 See Harmon, supra note 18, at 1151–60; STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 33–38, 229–31. 
 163 At least, it would be inappropriate for officers to use more force than is required to handcuff the fully 
compliant arrestee. For a thought-provoking challenge to the idea that custodial arrests are generally appropriate, 
see Harmon, supra note 161, at 307, 360. 
 164 Some have argued that the relative severity of a crime is proportional to the strength of the 
government’s interest in apprehension—essentially, that the government has a stronger interest in apprehending 
offenders who commit more serious crimes and a reduced interest in apprehending offenders who commit less 
serious crimes. See, e.g., Ayres & Markovits, supra note 161; see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 828 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Traffic violations generally will not support the use of a significant level of force.”). 
In other work, I have argued that, for legal purposes, a governmental interest in apprehension exists regardless 
of the relative severity of the crime, although the government would often be wise to consider severity in 
determining how it allocates its limited resources. STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98 (discussing force options 
in depth in Chapter 6). The fact that crime severity is a creature of statute and that legislators can and do take 
very different approaches to the gradation of crime severity suggests that debates about the strength of the 
government’s interest in apprehension for different crimes may be more suited as a topic for academic debate 
than as a predicate for constitutional jurisprudence. 
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likely to be a threat to officers and others than a suspected jaywalker. Indeed, 
the Fourth Circuit has made that point explicitly, concluding, “this first Graham 
factor is intended as a proxy for determining whether ‘an officer [had] any 
reason to believe that [the subject of a seizure] was a potentially dangerous 
individual.’”165  
Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly adopted that rationale, and lower 
courts have often failed to appreciate it. As a result, courts often mechanically 
recite the “severity of the crime” without much, if any, discussion of why it 
matters.166 In a § 1983 case arising from an officer’s use of force against the 
driver of a stolen vehicle, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s entire application of 
the first Graham factor consisted of three sentences: “The facts relevant to the 
‘severity of the crime’ prong are not genuinely at issue. The officers had reason 
to believe that Coles had stolen a car, a felony-grade offense. We agree with the 
district court that this factor weighs in favor of defendants.”167 The district court, 
for its part, had discussed at length why officers could have believed that the 
vehicle was stolen, then asserted without further analysis that the government’s 
interest in apprehending a felony suspect “‘strongly favors the government.’”168 
Other courts have similarly identified particular crimes as serious or not serious 
without distinguishing between the severity of criminal (or, perhaps, moral) 
culpability and the potential for physical harm to officers or others.169 
The other Graham factors—”whether the suspect poses an immediate threat 
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”170—can be similarly 
unhelpful. As Harmon observed, 
[T]hese are questions with binary answers: either the suspect poses a 
threat or not; flees or not; resists or not. . . . By stating these factors 
 
 165 Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 900 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smith 
v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
 166 See, e.g., Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub 
nom., Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 246 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 167 Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 628–29 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 168 Id. at 1099 (quoting Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted)). In a similar case, the Seventh Circuit discussed at length whether officers who used a baton launcher 
against a woman who refused to get out of a stationary vehicle could reasonably have thought that the vehicle 
was stolen without any discussion about why that mattered under the circumstances. Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 
678 F.3d 513, 522 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 169 See, e.g., Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 316 (5th Cir. 2016) (describing driving under the influence 
as “a serious crime”); Sanchez v. Obando-Echeverry, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (describing 
residential burglary as a “serious felony”) (internal citations omitted). 
 170 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
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in such terms, Graham provides a weak tool for evaluating the use of 
force, particularly in the common complex encounters that result in 
nondeadly uses of force by officers.171 
In short, even when the binary answers are useful for determining whether the 
situation justified some amount of force, they are patently unhelpful in assessing 
the more complex issues of what type of force and how much force is reasonable 
to use under the circumstances.172 
The Graham factors are not just a weak tool, though; they can be 
affirmatively misleading, overemphasizing considerations that are of little 
relevance and overlooking what can be critical information. Focusing on the 
nature of the subject’s actions in the abstract distracts from more pertinent 
considerations: did the subject’s actions, whatever they were, threaten to 
frustrate a legitimate government interest and, if so, to what extent? Womack v. 
Bradshaw is representative of this approach; two deputies arrested Marie 
Womack for driving under the influence after a roadside breathalyzer test 
indicated a 0.26% breath alcohol content.173 When Womack, who was 
handcuffed at the time, resisted the deputies’ attempt to “pull her towards the 
back door” of a squad car by kicking the door shut (incidentally striking a deputy 
in the shin), one of the deputies “quickly turned to his left, taking [Womack] to 
the ground. In the process, [Womack’s] face struck the road,” fracturing her 
jaw.174 One of the deputies lifted “her up by the arms” and, although she 
continued to resist, deputies were able to push her into the rear seat of the car.175 
The district court concluded that the takedown was objectively reasonable.176 It 
predicated its decision entirely upon the observation that Womack “actively 
resisted arrest,” describing her as “somewhat violent” but acknowledging both 
 
 171 Harmon, supra note 18, at 1130. 
 172 Id. at 1131. Force can be categorized in at least two ways that are relevant here. Perhaps most obviously, 
force can be assessed based on the foreseeable effect on the subject. The foreseeable results of a police officer 
using a firearm (e.g., serious bodily injury or death) are very different than the foreseeable results of an officer 
striking someone in the thigh with a baton (e.g., bruising). Separately, the mechanism by which force is intended 
to overcome the subject’s noncompliance or resistance is a relevant distinction. Pain compliance techniques, 
which work by using pain to induce the subject to abandon their resistance and comply with an officer’s 
commands, are meaningfully different from mechanical disruption techniques, which work by physically 
preventing the subject from resisting. As underlying mechanisms, pain compliance or mechanical disruption are 
not fungible; either one can be more or less appropriate to use depending on the situation. See STOUGHTON ET 
AL., supra note 98 (discussing force options in depth in Chapter 6). 
 173 Womack v. Bradshaw, 49 F. Supp. 3d 624, 628 (W.D. Mo. 2014), aff’d, 610 F. App’x 582 (8th Cir. 
2015). 
 174 Id. at 629–30. 
 175 Id. at 629. 
 176 Id. at 635. 
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that the relevant crimes (driving under the influence and resisting arrest) were 
not very serious and that there was “no indication that [Womack] posed an 
immediate threat to the officers.”177 There was no discussion of whether 
Womack’s actions actually threatened to frustrate the government’s interests in 
apprehending her or in the safety of the officers. In short, Womack is an example 
of how courts can focus myopically on the nature of the subject’s actions at the 
expense of analyzing the existence and severity of the threat that those actions 
pose to a government interest. 
It is entirely possible for courts to reach sound conclusions about whether an 
officer’s use of force was reasonable, of course, but there is a troubling potential 
for those decisions to be reached despite the Graham factors rather than because 
of them. Consider a hypothetical: a stark naked, physically frail octogenarian 
murder suspect weakly slaps at and pulls away from officers as they attempt to 
arrest him. The subject’s actions simply do not present any appreciable 
likelihood that the subject will escape or injure the officers.178 Most courts, I 
hope, would conclude that the use of more than a modicum of force, if even that 
much, is objectively unreasonable even though the crime is severe, the subject 
presents some (slight) physical threat to the officers, and the subject is both 
actively resisting and attempting to evade arrest. This conclusion demonstrates 
the conceptual inadequacies of the much-lauded Graham factors. The potential 
for courts to appreciate that the Graham factors are misleading in any given case 
may alleviate some concerns about poorly decided cases, but it does nothing to 
improve the Graham factors themselves. 
2. Lack of Operational Definition 
The Graham factors reflect three considerations that the Court viewed as 
especially important—at least, important enough to explicitly articulate—to the 
determination of whether a seizure was objectively reasonable.179 Frustratingly, 
though, the Court has not provided operational definitions of them.180 With 
regard to the severity of the crime, for example, the Court has clarified neither 
 
 177 Id. at 631, 633. 
 178 In other work, I have argued that a threat to a government interest exists only when the subject has the 
physical ability, the opportunity, and the apparent intention to engage in an identifiable action that would 
frustrate the relevant interest. STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 33–38, 229–31. 
 179 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 180 See Harry Alpert, Operational Definitions in Sociology, 3 AM. SOCIO. REV. 855, 856 (1938) (describing 
operational definitions as those that take into account the methods of execution, and are grounded in verifiable 
observation rather than “metaphysically conceived ‘properties’”). 
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how reviewers (looking at the situation through the lens of a reasonable officer) 
should determine severity nor how they should identify the relevant crime. 
With regard to severity, it is unclear whether reviewers’ attention should be 
directed to whether the crime is a “minor” crime, as in some Fourth Amendment 
contexts;181 or to how the crime is categorized as a matter of state law;182 or to 
the maximum punishment imposed (potentially including various sentencing 
enhancements); or to how the crime is classified in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting program; or to whether the crime is 
considered a “property” crime or a “persons” crime; or to some other 
characteristic or set of characteristics. Any of those approaches seem plausible, 
but they do not lead to consistent results. 
The theft of $250 of merchandise from a retail store in New Jersey, for 
example, is a fourth-degree “crime,”183 a term that the state uses instead of the 
more traditional word “felony.”184 But in neighboring Pennsylvania, the same 
theft is considered a first-degree misdemeanor (assuming the offender is not a 
recidivist).185 Felonies, as first-year law students learn, are generally more 
severe than misdemeanors, suggesting that the crime would be more serious in 
New Jersey than in Pennsylvania. But a fourth-degree crime in New Jersey is 
punishable by up to eighteen months of incarceration and a $10,000 fine,186 
while a first degree misdemeanor in Pennsylvania is punishable by incarceration 
for up to five years in prison and a $10,000 fine.187 To the extent that the severity 
of the crime is measured by the potential punishment, the crime would be 
considered more serious in Pennsylvania than in New Jersey. The Court has 
 
 181 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not allow 
officers to force entry into private homes without a warrant when the underlying crime is “only a minor offense”). 
 182 States follow different approaches to the classification of criminal offenses. Florida, for example, has 
five classes of felony (capital felonies, life felonies, and first-, second-, and third-degree felonies) and two classes 
of misdemeanor (first- and second-degree misdemeanors). FLA. STAT. § 775.081 (2020). Washington state, in 
contrast, has three classes of felony (Class A, B, and C) in addition to gross misdemeanors and misdemeanors. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021 ( 2020). New Jersey, meanwhile, has four numbered classes of “crimes” that are 
punishable by imprisonment of more than six months and two classes of “offenses” (“disorderly persons 
offenses” and “petty disorderly persons offenses”). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-4 (West 2020). In fact, the state 
statute provides that the term “misdemeanor” refers to “all crimes” (but not “offenses”) including those that 
would traditionally be considered felonies because violations are subject to punishment of more than a year in 
prison. § 2C:1-4(d). 
 183 § 2C:20-11(c)(3). Instead of the more common felony/misdemeanor distinction, New Jersey has 
“crimes” (or “indictable crimes”) and “disorderly persons offense[s].” § 2C:20-11(c)(4). 
 184 § 2C:1-4. 
 185 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903 (2020). 
 186 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-11(c)(3), 2C:43-6 (West 2020) (substantive crime and penalties, 
respectively). 
 187 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903 (2020); 30 PA. CONS. STAT. § 923(7) (2020). 
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provided no guidance about whether courts assessing the severity of a crime 
should look to its classification (e.g., as a felony or misdemeanor), or to how it 
is potentially punished, or whether severity should be gauged by other means. 
Meanwhile, a simple assault (causing or attempting to cause bodily injury) 
is considered a “disorderly persons” offense (the equivalent of a misdemeanor 
elsewhere) in New Jersey (punishable by up to six months in jail and a $1,000 
fine)188 and a second-degree misdemeanor in Pennsylvania189 (punishable by up 
to two years in prison and a $5,000 fine190). In both states, simple assault, a 
violent crime, is categorized as a less severe crime than a $250 theft, a property 
crime. The Court’s failure to robustly define this Graham factor leaves open the 
question of whether shoplifting or assault is the more severe crime, and thus 
potentially justifies a more invasive use of force under the Fourth Amendment, 
ceteris paribus. 
There is the potential for similar confusion with regard to identifying the 
crime (or crimes) considered relevant for purposes of Fourth Amendment 
analysis. Consider, for example, a shoplifter who runs away from officers 
shouting for them to stop, assaulting a bystander as they do so. It is unclear 
whether reviewers should consider the severity of the initial crime (shoplifting), 
or the intermediary crime (fleeing or failing to obey an officer’s lawful 
command), or the final crime (assault), or some combination of all three.191 
Similar criticisms can be fairly leveled against the other Graham factors. 
The Court has not, for example, provided any guidance as to how the reasonable 
officer on the scene would go about assessing the severity, likelihood, or 
immediacy of potential threats, nor has it identified what exactly constitutes 
“actively resisting” and what, if anything, distinguishes it from attempts to 
“evade arrest by flight.”192 The problem is not that these questions are 
unanswerable; the problem is the range of possible answers that present 
themselves can be inconsistent or incompatible with each other. The Court’s 
failure to provide operational definitions creates the potential for substantial 
confusion and inconsistencies in how the Graham factors are applied from case 
to case. 
 
 188 N.J. STAT. §§ 2C:33-2, 2C:1-4(a) (West 2020). 
 189 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 (2020). 
 190 § 1104. 
 191 I have argued in other work that, in situations involving multiple crimes, constitutional analysis should 
generally be predicated on the most severe crime, but that argument is grounded in policy rather than any clear 
expression of constitutional law. See STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98. 
 192 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
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3. Incompleteness 
In her work, Harmon identified how a threat to three distinct government 
interests—law enforcement, order maintenance, and officer safety—can, under 
appropriate circumstances, justify officers in using physical force.193 The three 
Graham factors—crime severity, physical threat, and resistance/flight—
implicate some, but not all, of those government interests. Specifically, they 
implicate the government’s interest in law enforcement and officer safety, but 
they are less useful when it comes to addressing the government’s interest in 
public order (including the safety of community members). That interest has 
been recognized in the Fourth Amendment context in the form of community 
caretaking. Community caretaking is “totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute.”194 As Debra Livingston has written: 
“Community caretaking” denotes a wide range of everyday police 
activities undertaken to aid those in danger of physical harm, to 
preserve property, or to create and maintain a feeling of security in the 
community. It includes things like the mediation of noise disputes, the 
response to complaints about stray and injured animals, and the 
provision of assistance to the ill or injured. Police must frequently care 
for those who cannot care for themselves: the destitute, the inebriated, 
the addicted . . . and the very young. They are often charged with 
taking lost property into their possession; they not infrequently see to 
the removal of abandoned property. . . . Community caretaking, then, 
is an essential part of the functioning of local police.195 
Not all aspects of community caretaking will justify police violence, but 
some could.196 In Ames v. King County, for example, paramedics were 
attempting to aid an unconscious man who was overdosing as part of a suicide 
attempt, but their efforts were being hindered by Tonja Ames, the man’s 
mother.197 Ames was refusing to allow the paramedics to treat her son and was 
 
 193 Harmon, supra note 18, at 1151–60. 
 194 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
 195 Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
261, 272 (1998). 
 196 This is not to suggest that the community caretaking function should be simplistically embraced. 
Academics have criticized community caretaking as a justification for infringement on otherwise applicable 
Fourth Amendment protections abound. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community 
Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1485, 1489 
(2009); see also Alyssa L. Lazar, Note, Protecting Individual’s Fourth Amendment Rights Against Government 
Usurpation: Resolutions to the Problematic and Redundant Community Caretaking Doctrine, 57 DUQ. L. REV. 
198, 213–14 (2019). 
 197 Ames v. King Cnty., 846 F.3d 340, 349 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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attempting to drive him to the hospital herself when Deputy Heather Volpe 
dragged Ames out of a vehicle, slammed her head into the ground, and restrained 
her in handcuffs.198 Ames later sued, alleging excessive force.199 The Graham 
factors were inapplicable or, at best, of limited use in determining the 
constitutionality of Deputy Volpe’s use of force. Ames did not present any threat 
to the officers, nor was she trying to evade arrest. She was arguably violating 
Washington Criminal Code § 9.08.040, which criminalizes impeding medics 
from attempting to discharge their legal duties, but the trial court concluded that 
the government had, at best, a weak interest in law enforcement because of low 
level of the offense (the offense is considered a “gross misdemeanor” in 
Washington).200 The lack of threat to a government interest, the trial court 
concluded, meant that Deputy Volpe’s use of force was unreasonable. 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. “Deputy Volpe was acting in her community 
caretaking capacity,” the court wrote, so the inquiry had to “focus . . . not on 
Ames’s misdemeanor crime of obstruction but instead on the serious—indeed, 
life-threatening—situation that was unfolding at the time.”201 The gravity of the 
situation, the court held, and the risk that Ames’s actions would seriously 
endanger her adult son’s life established that the government interests 
“outweighed any intrusion onto Ames’s Fourth Amendment rights.”202 The 
Ninth Circuit couched its analysis in terms of the Graham factors, but it had to 
stretch the scope of those factors almost beyond recognition in order to do so. 
Other courts have more bluntly acknowledged the limitations of the Graham 
factors. The Sixth Circuit, for example, adopted what it described as “a more 
tailored set of factors to be considered in the medical-emergency 
context . . . [w]here a situation does not fit within the Graham test because the 
person in question has not committed a crime, is not resisting arrest, and is not 
directly threatening the officer.”203 Specifically, that analysis requires asking the 
following questions: 
(1) Was the person experiencing a medical emergency that rendered 
him incapable of making a rational decision under circumstances that 
posed an immediate threat of serious harm to himself or others? 
 
 198 Id. at 345. 
 199 Id. at 346. 
 200 Id. at 348. 
 201 Id. at 348–49. 
 202 Id. at 349. 
 203 Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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(2) Was some degree of force reasonably necessary to ameliorate the 
immediate threat? 
(3) Was the force used more than reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances (i.e., was it excessive)?204 
The need to go beyond the Graham factors is particularly obvious in the 
context of involuntary detentions (or “holds”) for psychiatric evaluations. 
“Police in all jurisdictions have the authority to detain a person who appears to 
pose an imminent danger, . . . 38 states explicitly authorize police and peace or 
parole officers to initiate the emergency hold process,” and the remaining states 
allow officers to effect a hold initiated by a judge, medical professional, social 
worker, or other authorized entity.205 Courts have recognized “[t]he government 
has an important interest in providing assistance to a person in need of 
psychiatric care.”206 In some circumstances, though, the subject will refuse to 
comply, threatening to frustrate that interest. In such cases, the Graham factors 
will be of little, if any, use in determining whether the government had a valid 
interest or assessing the strength of that interest. Nor do the Graham factors help 
assess the constitutional limits of force. 
Even in cases where the government has a clear interest, the Graham factors 
are not sufficient to identify the full range of subject behaviors that may threaten 
to frustrate those interests. Consider, for example, the classic “passive protestor” 
lying across the driveway of an abortion clinic or immigration facility, refusing 
officers’ orders to move but remaining limp when officers attempt to pick them 
up or drag them off. The subject’s actions are often relatively minor crimes 
(disorderly conduct, refusing to obey lawful commands, or the like), the 
subject’s non-compliance does not itself present a threat to the officer or others, 
and the subject is not engaged in “active resistance” or making any attempt to 
flee. Nevertheless, they can present a threat to public order (e.g., ensuring traffic 
safety and access to the relevant facility) or safety (e.g., ensuring that injured 
persons have access to emergency medical aid) and potentially in law 
enforcement (e.g., effecting the arrest of protestors whose noncompliance 
amounts to a criminal violation). 
The Graham factors were not intended to be exhaustive. It is entirely 
possible to add to them or identify additional factors relevant to the 
 
 204 Id. 
 205 Leslie C. Hedman, State Laws on Emergency Holds for Mental Health Stabilization, 67 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 529, 530–31 (2016). 
 206 Bryan v. MacPherson, 620 F.3d 805, 829 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. 
Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 900 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
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constitutional analysis, as the Sixth Circuit has done. However, they have 
become touchstones that are too often cited despite their lack of relevance,207 or, 
as in Ames, applied in untenable ways.208 
C. Getting Bogged down in the “Factbound Morass” 
As discussed in the preceding sections, use of force does not always 
constitute a seizure,209 and when it does, the Graham factors can be unhelpful or 
affirmatively detrimental to the analysis.210 But there is yet another flaw in the 
Fourth Amendment’s regulation of police violence: courts applying the Graham 
framework often fail to include relevant information in the constitutional 
analysis. This can be intentional, as when courts consider and consciously decide 
that certain pieces of information are irrelevant to their analysis. More 
problematically, though, the privileging of certain facts and circumstances over 
others can be unintentional, as when courts fail to consider that certain 
information might be salient. 
There is a degree of tension in the Fourth Amendment framework. On the 
one hand, the Court has emphasized that constitutional analysis requires “careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,”211 which means 
“slosh[ing] . . . through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’” in any given 
case.212 On the other hand, the Court has adopted a deferential approach to 
review. In Tennessee v. Garner, Justice O’Connor emphasized at the beginning 
of her dissent the “difficult, split-second decisions police officers must make in” 
use-of-force cases.213 The Court picked up on that language in Graham, 
reminding lower courts that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody 
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”214 In many 
 
 207 Lawrence v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 258 F. Supp. 3d 977, 989–90 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (listing the 
Graham factors, but never explaining how they applied or affected the analysis). 
 208 Ames v. King Cnty., 846 F.3d 340, 349 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 209 See supra Part II.A. 
 210 See supra Part II.B. 
 211 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 212 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007). 
 213 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 214 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. I have previously argued that most uses of force do not involve the 
chaotic scene that the Court imagined in Graham. Stoughton, supra note 2, at 864. Indeed, Graham itself did 
not involve such chaos. Graham’s injuries were inflicted after he had been placed in handcuffs, which officers 
applied while he was unconscious. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The officers who arrested Graham were not forced 
by the situation to make any “split-second judgments” about using force, nor did their use of force occur in a 
“tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation. Id. at 397. As Brandon Garrett and I have observed, “This 
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cases, that tension has led courts to get bogged down in the “factbound morass” 
by paying careful attention to some of the facts and circumstances while 
overlooking other facts and circumstances, often without acknowledging that 
they are doing so and typically in a way that favors officers. 
Some courts, for example, have held that the constitutionality of an officer’s 
use of force must be determined by looking exclusively at what the officer did 
at the moment the officer used force (or a few seconds before), omitting any 
review of the officer’s conduct prior to the constitutional seizure. In Greenridge 
v. Ruffin, officers observed a suspected prostitute getting into Leonard 
Greenridge’s vehicle.215 Officer Ernestine Ruffin followed the vehicle until it 
parked, then approached without using her emergency lights or flashlights and 
without waiting for other officers.216 Officer Ruffin opened the car door, 
identified herself as an officer, then shot Greenridge as he reached for what she 
thought was a shotgun, but was in fact a wooden nightstick.217 Greenridge sued, 
arguing that Officer Ruffin’s decision not to wait for other officers and her 
failure to use her flashlight were improper and contributed to the shooting.218 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that those factors were irrelevant, writing, “events 
which occurred before Officer Ruffin opened the car door and identified herself 
to the passengers are not probative of the reasonableness of Ruffin’s decision to 
fire the shot.”219 The Seventh Circuit has come to substantially the same 
conclusion, holding, “The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, 
not unreasonable, unjustified or outrageous conduct in general. . . . Therefore, 
pre-seizure conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”220 
This approach fails to recognize what legal scholars, criminologists, and 
police practitioners have concluded without exception: an officer’s approach, 
actions, and decisions can affect the probability and severity of an ultimate use 
of force.221 The way an officer interacts with someone, for example, can 
 
case was not the ideal vehicle to develop the notion that police officers must sometimes make quick-fire 
decisions and that an objective standard might best be used to analyze excessive-force claims under the Fourth 
Amendment.” Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 55, at 231. 
 215 Greenridge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Greenridge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 220 See Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 221 See STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 155; Zuchel v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 739 
(10th Cir. 1993) (reflecting the testimony of James Fyfe); James J. Fyfe, The Split-Second Syndrome and Other 
Determinants of Police Violence, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 466, 475–77 
(Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 6th ed. 2010); Jeffrey J. Noble & Geoffrey P. Alpert, State-
Created Danger: Should Police Officers Be Accountable for Reckless Tactical Decision Making?, in CRITICAL 
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potentially provoke or prevent resistance.222 In the same vein, poor tactics can 
expose the officer to physical danger that a different approach is likely to avoid, 
increasing the likelihood that the officer will use force to address that danger.223 
These observations are well known in policing: over at least the last fifty years, 
the industry has developed a range of tactics—that is, procedures and techniques 
intended to help “limit the suspect’s ability to inflict harm and advance the 
ability of the officer to conclude the situation in the safest and least intrusive 
way”224—that apply in specific situations (e.g., traffic stops, domestic disputes, 
and active shooter scenarios), as well as tactical principles that can be applied 
whenever the situation permits.225 As a purely descriptive matter, almost every 
incident of police violence is the ultimate result of “a contingent sequence of 
decisions and resulting behaviors—each increasing or decreasing the probability 
of an eventual use of . . . force,” including officers’ decisions and behaviors.226 
The constitutional relevance of an officer’s “pre-seizure” conduct is 
suggested by its practical import, and several courts have held that officer’s 
actions prior to a seizure can affect whether the seizure—here, the use of force—
was reasonable.227 Other courts, however, have disagreed.228 When courts hold 
that events—particularly an officer’s actions—that precede the seizure are not 
probative of the reasonableness of the use of force, they are effectively 
reviewing two separate timelines. With regard to the officer, the courts look only 
at the use of force itself or, perhaps, a few seconds prior to the use of force. With 
regard to the subject, however, the courts are willing to adopt a much more 
expansive perspective. Graham itself suggests as much, directing courts to 
consider the severity of the crime even when the subject is suspected of having 
committed it minutes, hours, days, or weeks earlier. Courts routinely include in 
the analysis actions that the subject engaged in previously but had stopped doing 
 
ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, supra, at 481, 493; Off. of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., 
Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1 (2015), 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf; Community Oriented Policing Service Home 
Page, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://cops.usdoj.gov (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). 
 222 Seth W. Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops & Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 611, 652–58 (2016). 
 223 STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 154–58; Noble & Alpert, supra note 221, at 481, 493. 
 224 Noble & Alpert, supra note 221, at 567, 568. 
 225 STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98. 
 226 Arnold Binder & Peter Scharf, The Violent Police-Citizen Encounter, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 111, 116 (1980). 
 227 See, e.g., Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 
291–92 (3d Cir. 1999); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1161 (6th Cir. 1996); Allen v. Muskogee, 119 
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 228 See Greenridge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991); Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
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by the time officers used force.229 In application, then, “final frame” perspective 
becomes one-sided, determining the reasonableness of a use of force by looking 
to the subject’s precipitating behaviors but ignoring the officer’s. 
In summary, regardless of how well the Fourth Amendment regulates 
seizures—an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article—the constitutional 
regulation of police violence is troublingly deficient. The Fourth Amendment 
simply will not apply to a number of use-of-force incidents, and when it does 
apply, the constitutional framework itself can contribute to analytical oversights. 
D. Inconsistent and Undefined: The Reasonableness of Deadly Force 
In most Fourth Amendment contexts, the Court, it is assumed, picks its 
words with care, allowing lower courts and commentators to carefully parse 
consistent language in various opinions so as to synthesize a definition. Indeed, 
the Court often does this itself. The Court has, for example, consistently defined 
the concept of “probable cause” by referring to the “man of reasonable caution” 
since 1925,230 and that verbiage built on the “man of prudence and caution” 
language that the Court used in 1878.231 There is, in short, a textual thread that 
lower courts can follow to find their way through the admittedly tangled path of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Not so in the context of police violence, where chronological scrutiny of the 
Court’s language reveals frustrating inconsistencies and failures to define 
apparently salient terms. In Tennessee v. Garner, decided in 1985, the Court held 
that for officers to use deadly force, the subject must pose “a significant threat 
of death or serious physical injury,” but did not define “significant.”232 
Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court wrote that officers may use deadly force 
when “the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,” without including 
any discussion of the significance of that threat.233 Further, the Court stated that 
“[w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to 
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use 
 
 229 See, e.g., Martin v. Gentile, 849 F. 2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (“These officers were charged with the 
task of arresting a serial rapist who was known to carry knives and to use them on people, had prior arrests for 
violent crimes, and was actively resisting arrest.”). 
 230 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
 231 Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). 
 232 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (emphasis added). The Court also did not define “serious 
physical injury,” although it may be assumed that the Court was incorporating the legal understanding of that 
term or its synonyms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3) (1983) (defining serious bodily injury in the consumer 
protection context). 
 233 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
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of deadly force to do so,”234 suggesting that a degree of temporal proximity was 
required, at least with regard to the threat to officers. In the next paragraph, 
however, the Court indicated that officers could use deadly force to prevent a 
subject from escaping when “there is probable cause to believe that [the subject] 
has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious 
physical harm,” at least if the officer provided a warning, when feasible, before 
doing so.235 In the latter language, there appears to be no temporal proximity 
requirement. 
In Scott v. Harris, decided in 2007, the Court held that the ramming of a 
fleeing driver’s vehicle was reasonable because the subject “posed a substantial 
and immediate risk of serious physical injury.”236 Although Harris may have 
less effect than a plain reading would suggest,237 the Court’s use of “immediate” 
appears to reflect the temporal proximity requirement suggested in Garner. As 
with Garner, however, the Court did not define that term. Further, it is unclear 
whether the Court’s reference to a “substantial” threat is intended to be 
synonymous with the earlier opinion’s description of a “significant” threat. This 
is especially confusing because neither the use of “significant” (Garner) or 
“substantial” (Harris) refers to the type or severity of the threat itself. In both 
cases, the nature of the threat is explicitly identified: “death or serious physical 
injury.” But neither can “significant” and “substantial” be easily read to refer to 
the degree of certainty that such harm will result—essentially precluding 
speculative threats from justifying the use of deadly force—since that would 
suggest that they were standards of proof. The problem, of course, is that the 
Court has already identified the relevant standard of proof: “probable cause.”238 
Perhaps “significant” and “substantial” should be, like “immediate,” read as a 
temporal requirement. 
This is not merely semantics, or at least it is not an empty semantic exercise. 
Small changes in wording can lead lower courts to apply very difficult decision 
rules. Consider, for example, a known murderer who, having been surprised by 
the police while bathing, is currently fleeing on foot, stark naked and unarmed. 
Assuming that officers’ only option to prevent his escape is deadly force, would 
shooting the fleeing subject in the back under such circumstances be 
constitutional? Applying the language from Garner, the officers have “probable 
cause to believe that [the subject] has committed a crime involving the infliction 
 
 234 Id. (emphasis added). 
 235 Id. at 1112. 
 236 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 237 See supra notes 55–63 and accompanying text. 
 238 Garner, 471 U.S. at 3. 
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or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”239 The subject “poses no 
immediate threat to the officer[s]” but does present a “threat to others.”240 
Perhaps that threat is “significant,” perhaps it is not, and perhaps it does not have 
to be. The language from Scott is no better. The murder suspect does not present 
“a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury” at the time, but 
Harris suggested that he may not have to for the use of deadly force to be a 
reasonable response.241 
In short, even in the context where the rules seem most straightforward, it is 
difficult to plumb the cases for textual cues about the contours of police authority 
to use deadly force. 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT SPILLAGE INTO THE SUB-CONSTITUTIONAL 
REGULATION OF POLICE VIOLENCE 
The prior Part offered an in-depth doctrinal analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment’s regulation of police violence, concluding that it is under-
inclusive, imprecise, and woefully deficient. Fortunately, there are additional 
regulatory mechanisms in the form of state law and police agency policy. 
Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment framework has been incorporated into 
state law, agency policy, and police culture, bringing its limitations with it. 
When state courts interpret state law, many have referred explicitly to the Fourth 
Amendment standards. Both police agency policies and the institutional culture 
of policing have hewed tightly to the constitutional framework for evaluating 
police uses of force. In that way, the Fourth Amendment has spilled over the 
constitutional banks, seeping—or pouring—into the sub-constitutional 
regulation of police violence. This Part explores that spillage and its 
implications.242 
A. State Law 
The provisions of state law that authorize or regulate police violence fall into 
three categories.243 Most common are the statutory provisions or state judicial 
 
 239 Id. at 11. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Harris, 550 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). 
 242 This Article is not the first to observe that Fourth Amendment doctrines have over-spilled their 
doctrinal banks. As Wadie Said has persuasively argued, there is a “symbiotic relationship” between the 
constitutional rules that govern domestic policing and both arguments with regard to and the rules that develop 
in the contexts of immigration enforcement and national security. Wadie E. Said, Law Enforcement in the 
American Security State, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 819, 820 (2019). 
 243 Officers are subject to regulation not only by laws that specifically target policing, but also by more 
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decisions that govern those uses of force that are likely to result in death or great 
bodily harm244 (often referred to in state law as “force,” and for which I will 
adopt the industry standard term of “less-lethal force”), and those that are likely 
to (invariably referred to in state statutes as “deadly force”). Less commonly, a 
few states explicitly regulate threats of force, as distinct from the actual 
application of force.245 
Thirty-seven states have statutes that regulate less-lethal force by identifying 
when246 and how much247 force officers can use. Forty-two states have statutes 
 
generally applicable laws. See Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
2179, 2181 (2014). As is relevant to the context of this Article, officers may be regulated both by state laws that 
authorize (or establish civil or criminal defenses for) police violence and by state laws that apply more generally, 
such as the laws governing self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property. The Florida Supreme Court, 
for example, held that even if officer’s use of deadly force was not authorized by the state laws regulating police 
violence, it could be authorized under the state’s “Stand Your Ground” self-defense laws. State v. Peraza, 259 
So. 3d 728 (Fla. 2018). 
 244 Different jurisdictions may adopt inconsistent definitions of “great bodily harm” or its synonyms, 
“serious bodily injury,” “grievous bodily harm,” et cetera. In California, for example, the loss of consciousness 
constitutes “serious bodily injury” for purposes of the state’s battery statute. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(f)(4) (West 
2020). In Tennessee, that bar is only met by “protracted unconsciousness.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39–11–
106(b)(36)(B) (2020). Often, the discrepancies come down to the role of the fact finder establishing great bodily 
harm. In California, for example, a robbery victim’s suffering a possibly broken nose, a black eye, some loose 
teeth, and “bleeding about the face” was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he had suffered “great 
bodily injury,” although the jury was not required to so find. People v. James, 284 P.2d 527, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1955). 
 245 This is not to suggest that an officer’s threat to use force will be entirely unregulated. Most states, after 
all, criminalize assault. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(A)(2) (2020) (criminalizing “intentionally placing 
another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury”). In states without explicit regulation, 
officers’ threats to use force may be subject to regulation under statutes that authorize officers to make arrests, 
for example. See IDAHO CODE § 19-610 (2020) (authorizing “all reasonable and necessary means to effect the 
arrest”). 
The few states that explicitly regulate threats of less-lethal force do so in the same way that they regulate the 
actual application of less-lethal force. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-409(a) (2020) (imposing the same 
statutory requirements when officers are “threatening or using physical force against another”) 
A handful of states explicitly regulate police threats of lethal force. Four states equate threats to use lethal force 
and the actual application of less-lethal force. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.370(A) (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
610(a) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-18-2, 22-18-3 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-620(a), 40-7-
108(a) (2020). Arizona takes a different approach, authorizing officers to threaten to use less-lethal force, but 
not lethal force, to stop a fleeing misdemeanant, but without limiting threats of lethal force to those situations in 
which lethal force could be justified. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-409, 13-410 (2020). 
 246 All thirty-seven states with statutes authorizing police to use less-lethal force authorize them to do so 
to effect an arrest, although they have different requirements (e.g., ten states authorize force only when officers 
reasonably believe that the arrest is lawful, while nine authorize force so long as the officer subjectively believes 
the arrest is lawful). Twenty-four states have statutes permit the use of force to prevent an arrestee from escaping. 
Eighteen states have statutes permitting officers to use force to defend themselves or others. STOUGHTON ET AL., 
supra note 98, at 73–77. 
 247 Twenty-seven states authorize officers to use “reasonably necessary” force, four states authorize 
“reasonable” force, and two states authorize “necessary” force. Id. at 77–79. 
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that regulate deadly force, falling into one or more of three categories:248 the 
fleeing felon rule, under which officers can use deadly force to prevent the 
escape of a fleeing felon;249 the Garner rule, under which officers can use deadly 
force when there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm;250 and an 
intermediate category that requires more than the fleeing felon rule but less than 
an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.251 Some states have also 
adopted additional limitations,252 restrictions, or requirements on the use of 
 
 248 Previous work has divided states into two exclusive categories: “fleeing felon” rule states and “Garner 
rule” states. Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years After Garner, 
35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 120–21 (2016). My review of state laws concludes that they are not so easily 
catalogued. 
 249 ALA. CODE. § 13A-3-27 (2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.05 (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(1)(d) 
(2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-33 (2020). 
 250 ALA. CODE. § 13A-3-27(b)(2) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-410(C)(1) (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
2-610(b)(2) (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707(2)(a) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22(c)(1) (2020); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-4-20(b) (2020); IDAHO CODE § 18-4011(2) (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-5(2) (2019–
2020); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-3(b)(1)(B) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5227(a) (2020); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, 
§ 107(2)(A) (2019); MINN. STAT. § 609.066 (Subd. 2(1)) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.1455(2) (2020); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5(II)(a) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-7(b)(2)(d)(i) (West 2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30-2-6(B) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1)(c) (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
401(d)(2)(a) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 732(3) (2020); 2020 
Oregon Laws 2d Sp. Sess. H.B. 4301; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 508(a)(1) (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
404(1)(c) (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(5)(b) (2020). Seven states authorize the use of deadly 
force when a subject is escaping or attempting to escape “by use of” or “by means of” a deadly weapon, a 
particularized circumstance in which there is a threat of death or great bodily harm. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
410(C)(2)(b) (2020); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-5(2) (2019–2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5227(a) (2020); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 563.046(3)(b) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5(II)(b)(1) (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
401(d)(2)(b) (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 732(2)(b) (2020). 
 251 In other work, I have identified seven different intermediate approaches. First, twenty-four states 
authorize the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of subjects suspected of committing violent felonies or 
crimes involving the use or threatened use of deadly force. Second, three states identify the predicate crimes 
more specifically, providing a list of offenses for which flight can justify deadly force. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-
7(b)(2)(c) (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2020); 2020 Oregon Laws 2d Sp. Sess. 
H.B. 4301. Third, nineteen states permit the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a subject who may 
present a future threat of death or great bodily harm, even if they do not currently do so. Fourth, six states 
authorize it to prevent the escape of armed subjects, but without requiring that the subject be using the weapon 
to effect their escape. Fifth, Rhode Island has a unique information-forcing requirement; officers can use deadly 
force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon, but only when officers reasonably believe that “the person to be 
arrested is aware that a peace officer is attempting to arrest him or her.” 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-9 (2020). Sixth, 
North Carolina permits the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a convicted felon. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 15A-401(d)(2)(c) (2020). Seventh, some states have adopted combinations of those intermediate requirements. 
See STOUGHTON ET AL., supra note 98, at 82–84. 
 252 It is worth observing that a few states have statutes that, under certain circumstances, may be even 
more permissive with regard to the use of deadly force than the common law “fleeing felon” rule. Nine states 
permit it to suppress a riot or mutiny, although the specific requirements vary. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
410(c)(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467(e)(2) (2020); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4011(2) 
(2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(1)(h) (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412(7)(b)(ii) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 508(d)(1)(ii)(B) (2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-33 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2305(3) 
(2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(1)(c)(4) (2020). 
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deadly force, such as precluding the use of deadly force when there is a 
substantial risk to innocent persons,253 prohibiting the use of deadly force against 
suicidal subjects who threaten only themselves,254 requiring “actual 
resistance,”255 permitting deadly force only when all other reasonable means 
have been exhausted,256 information-forcing requirements,257 and limitations on 
the predicate crime.258 There is nothing particularly unusual about the state-level 
regulation of violence. In addition to police violence and crimes of violence, for 
example, states have statutes that govern boxing,259 that define what constitutes 
a weapon,260 that establish the scope of self-defense as an immunity to 
liability,261 and so on. What is unusual is the extent to which state courts have 
referenced or incorporated constitutional law into their interpretation of the state 
laws that specifically regulate police uses of force. 
Courts in thirty-one states have, while applying or discussing state law, 
referenced the constitutional framework articulated in Graham.262 Nineteen 
 
 253 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 467(c)(2), (e)(1), (f)(2) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-307(3)(c) (2020); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1412(3)(c), (7)(b)(1) (2020); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2C:3-7(b)(2)(b), (c), (e)(2) (West 2020); 
Julian v. Randazzo, 403 N.E.2d 931, 934 n.1 (Mass. 1980); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 508(d)(1)(ii)(A) 
(2020) (applying this restriction only when deadly force is used to prevent suicide or the commission of a crime). 
 254 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467(e) (2020); CAL. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 835a(c)(2) (West 2020); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-1412 (7)(b) (2020), N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:3-7(e) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 508(d) (2020); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-620(b)(2) (2020). 
 255 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4011(2) (2020); MISS. CODE § 97-3-15(1)(b) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.16.040(1)(b) (2020). 
 256 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467(c) (2020); IOWA CODE § 804.8(1) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 627:5(VIII) (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-620(b), 40-7-108(b) (2020); see also CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 835a(a)(2) (West 2020) (including in the legislative directives that officers “shall use other available resources 
and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable officer”). 
 257 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 107(2)(B)(1)–(2) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5(II)(b)(2) (2020); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-620(b) (2020). 
 258 Colorado, which otherwise follows the Garner rule, does not permit officers to use lethal force when 
the only indication that the subject presents a threat of death or serious bodily harm is the subject’s commission 
of “a motor vehicle violation.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707(2)(b)(III) (2020). 
 259 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-81-10 (2020). 
 260 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 939.22(10) (2020) (defining “dangerous weapon” to mean “any firearm, 
whether loaded or unloaded; any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily 
harm; any ligature or other instrumentality used on the throat, neck, nose, or mouth of another person to impede, 
partially or completely, breathing or circulation of blood; any electric weapon . . . ; or any other device or 
instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or 
great bodily harm”). 
 261 There are, of course, a variety of approaches, including states that provide a defense to criminal 
liability, but not to civil liability. See Self-Defense and “Stand Your Ground”, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (May 26, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/self-defense-and-stand-
your-ground.aspx. 
 262 Alaska: Russell ex rel. J.N. v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 802 (Alaska 2011). 
Arizona: Caudillo v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0467, 2010 WL 2146408, at *2 n.6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
May 27, 2010). 
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have done so with Tennessee v. Garner or, less often, Scott v. Harris.263 A few 
have done so for reasons that are only tangentially related to the use of force. In 
 
Arkansas: Ewells v. Constant, 2012 Ark. 148, at *4 (2012). 
California: Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 51316 (Cal. 2009) (applying an earlier version of 
California law). 
Colorado: Martinez v. Harper, 802 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Colo. App. 1990). 
Connecticut: State v. Saturno, 139 A.3d 629, 652 (Conn. 2016); State v. Smith, 807 A.2d 500, 515–516 
n.12, 518–19 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). 
Delaware: Elliott v. Dunn, Civ. A. No. 94C-04-026, 1995 WL 411406, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 6, 1995); 
Cornish v. Del. State Police, No. CIV. A. 94C-12-019, 1996 WL 453304, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 19, 1996). 
Florida: Brown ex rel. Brown v. Jenne, 122 So. 3d 881, 885 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
Georgia: Kline v. KDB, Inc., 673 S.E.2d 516, 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
Idaho: James v. City of Boise, 376 P.3d 33, 4546 (Idaho 2016). 
Illinois: People v. Mandarino, 994 N.E.2d 138, 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).  
Indiana: Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2017). 
Iowa: State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 470 (Iowa 2012). 
Kentucky: Brown v. Fournier, No. 2015-CA-001429-MR, 2017 WL 2391709, at *45 (Ky. June 2, 2017). 
Louisiana: State v. Palmer, 14 So. 3d 304, 310 (La. 2009). 
Maine: Richards v. Town of Eliot, 780 A.2d 281, 287 (Me. 2001). 
Maryland: Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 57 (Md. 2000). 
Michigan: Webb v. City of Taylor, No. 236153, 2002 WL 31947931, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2002). 
Mississippi: Williams v. Lee Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 744 So. 2d 286, 297 (Miss. 1999). 
Nebraska: Phillips v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 876 N.W.2d 361, 369 (Neb. 2016). 
Nevada: Lane v. State, No. 66733, 131 Nev. 1309, at *1 (Nov. 13, 2015). 
New Mexico: State v. Mantelli, 42 P.3d 272, 277 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002). 
New York: McCummings v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 613 N.E.2d 559, 561 (N.Y. 1993). 
Ohio: State v. White, 29 N.E.3d 939, 944–50, 952–53 (Ohio 2015). 
Oklahoma: Morales v. City of Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City Police Dep’t, 230 P.3d 869, 880 n.48 
(Okla. 2010). 
Rhode Island: Albanese v. Town of Narragansett, 135 A.3d 1179, 1188 (R.I. 2016). 
South Carolina: Heyward v. Christmas, 593 S.E.2d 141, 144 (S.C. 2004). 
Vermont: Coll v. Johnson, 636 A.2d 336, 338 (Vt. 1993). 
Virginia: Bufford v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0630-08-4, 2009 WL 2222970, at *8 (Va. Ct. App. July 
28, 2009). 
West Virginia: Maston v. Wagner, 781 S.E.2d 936, 94950 (W. Va. 2015). 
Wyoming: Wilson v. State, 199 P.3d 517, 520 n.3 (Wyo. 2009). 
 263 Arizona: Caudillo v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0467, 2010 WL 2146408, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
May 27, 2010). 
California: Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 515 (Cal. 2009). 
Colorado: Martinez v. Harper, 802 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Colo. App. 1990). 
Delaware: Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 174 (Del. 1988). 
Florida: Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 760 n.2 (Fla. 1997). 
Georgia: Mullis v. State, 27 S.E.2d 91, 98 (Ga. 1943); State v. Bunn, 701 S.E.2d 138, 139 n.2 (Ga. 2010). 
Iowa: State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 469 (Iowa 2012). 
Kentucky: Bell v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Ky. 2003). 
Maryland: Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 73 (Md. 2000). 
Michigan: Washington v. Starke, 433 N.W.2d 834, 83637 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
Minnesota: Baker v. Chaplin, 517 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. 1994). 
Nevada: Newell v. State, 364 P.3d 602, 604 (Nev. 2015). 
New Mexico: State v. Mantelli, 42 P.3d 272, 278 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002). 
New York: McCummings v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 613 N.E.2d 559, 561 (N.Y. 1993). 
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Delaware, for example, the state supreme court discussed and ultimately 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion in Garner that burglary was not a 
serious crime.264 
Other states, however, are far less discriminating, explicitly adopting part or 
all of the constitutional framework as a matter of state law. In Arizona, a plaintiff 
argued that an officer who had shot him could not claim that his actions were 
justified under a state statute authorizing the use of force “in making or assisting 
in making an arrest or detention” because the use of deadly force is inconsistent 
with effecting an arrest. Citing Garner, the state appellate court concluded that 
because a police shooting is a Fourth Amendment seizure, it counts as an arrest 
for purposes of state law.265 In short, the court looked to constitutional law to 
answer a question about the reach of the state’s regulatory regime for police uses 
of force.266 Iowa courts have taken a similar approach, using constitutional 
jurisprudence to determine that the state law regulating police violence is 
objective—such that an officer’s malice is irrelevant to the analysis—instead of 
subjective.267 In both examples, the scope and contours of state law were 
defined, in relevant part, by constitutional law. 
Other states have gone even further by weaving constitutional law into state 
law. Oklahoma, for example, has adopted Graham’s objective reasonableness 
framework, including the Graham factors, but has supplemented them with 
some additional factors: 
We . . . hold that a police officer has a special dispensation from the 
duty of ordinary care not to endanger others. A police officer’s duty is 
very specific: it is to use only such force in making an arrest as a 
reasonably prudent police officer would use in light of the objective 
circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest. In 
applying this standard, an officer’s subjective mistake of fact or law is 
irrelevant, including whether he (she) is acting in good faith or bad. 
The question is whether the objective facts support the degree of force 
employed. 
 
Ohio: State v. White, 29 N.E.3d 939, 944–45, 947, 950, 952 (Ohio 2015). 
Rhode Island: Albanese v. Town of Narragansett, 135 A.3d 1179, 1189 (R.I. 2016). 
South Carolina: Sheppard v. State, 594 S.E.2d 462, 473 (S.C. 2004). 
West Virginia: Maston v. Wagner, 781 S.E.2d 936, 952 (W. Va. 2015). 
Wyoming: Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 484 (Wyo. 1988). 
 264 Williams v. State, 539 A.2d 164, 174 (Del. 1988). 
 265 Caudillo, 2010 WL 2146408, at *2. 
 266 Id. at 2 n.6 (“It appears . . . that [the officer] was ‘effectuating an arrest’ because his use of deadly force 
against Celaya constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.”). 
 267 Chelf v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City of Davenport, 515 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). 
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Among the factors that may be considered in evaluating the objective 
reasonableness of an officer’s use of force in making an arrest are: 
(1) the severity of the crime of which the arrestee is suspected; 
(2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, [sic] (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest; (4) the known character of the 
arrestee; (5) the existence of alternative methods of accomplishing the 
arrest; (6) the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers 
compared to those of the suspect; and (7) the exigency of the 
moment.268 
Some states have effectively incorporated Fourth Amendment standards as 
a matter of state law. In Maryland, for example, the Court of Appeals held that 
the objective reasonableness standard “announced in the context of a § 1983 
claim for the violation of Federal Constitutional rights[] is the appropriate one 
to apply as well to petitioner’s claim under Article 26 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights and for the common law claims of battery and gross 
negligence.”269 The Supreme Court of Vermont has done effectively the same 
thing.270 The Supreme Court of Ohio came to a similar decision in the 
prosecution of an officer for violating a state homicide statute, writing: 
Ohio courts [have] also recognized that a police officer is justified at 
common law to use reasonable force in the course and scope of his law 
enforcement duties. . . . 
. . . 
Courts therefore apply Garner and Graham in reviewing criminal 
convictions arising from a police officer’s use of deadly 
force. . . . Because a police officer’s justification to use deadly force is 
limited by the Fourth Amendment, the appropriate instruction on 
deadly force is taken from Tennessee v. Garner. Garner establishes 
that “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect 
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others,” 
the officer does not act unreasonably by using deadly force. 
. . . Garner defines the very circumstances to be considered in a deadly 
force case such as this; that is, when there is probable cause for a police 
 
 268 Morales v. City of Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City Police Dep’t, 230 P.3d 869, 879–80 (Okla. 
2010). 
 269 Richardson v. McGriff, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (Md. 2000). 
 270 Coll v. Johnson, 636 A.2d 336, 338–39 (Vt. 1993) (“In cases where plaintiffs allege excessive force, 
that standard will be whether the force used was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
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officer to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical 
harm to the officer or others.271 
Florida offers an even more extreme example of the incorporation of 
constitutional law into state law. The first few sentences of Article I, Section 12 
of the Florida Constitution is closely analogous to the Fourth Amendment, 
reading: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against 
the unreasonable interception of private communications by any 
means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except 
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, 
thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, 
and the nature of evidence to be obtained.272 
The Florida Constitution goes on to direct courts to interpret the state’s 
constitutional limitations “in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”273 Thus, 
to the extent that an individual alleges that an officer’s use of force violated his 
or her state constitutional rights, the individual must expect the resulting analysis 
to follow the Fourth Amendment framework. 
As these examples illustrate, the Fourth Amendment’s regulation of police 
uses of force has spilled, often heavily, into state law. 
B. Agency Policy 
Like state law, the police agency policies that regulate the use of force have 
been heavily influenced by constitutional law. In an empirical analysis of use-
of-force policies at the fifty largest police agencies in the country (by the number 
of officers employed), Brandon Garrett and I found that more than half of the 
policies paraphrased or quoted directly, often without attribution, from Graham 
or Garner.274 This is not inherently problematic; constitutional law is the 
relevant legal standard governing seizures, after all, and agencies can reasonably 
conclude that officers should be informed of the standards under which 
constitutional tort claims may be adjudicated. It is unsurprising, then, that 
agencies would acknowledge in policy the relevant Fourth Amendment rules. 
 
 271 State v. White, 29 N.E.3d 939, 944–50, 952–53 (Ohio 2015). 
 272 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12, cls. 1–2. 
 273 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12, cl. 3. 
 274 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 55, at 284–85. 
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The Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department policy, for example, 
includes the following: 
The Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment 
“reasonableness” inquiry is whether the officers’ actions are 
“objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances 
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 
motivation. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and 
its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers 
are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of 
force necessary in a particular situation. (Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386, 396–397 [1989]).275 
But many agencies do not just acknowledge the constitutional standard; they 
hew closely to it. A public health analysis of police agency use-of-force policies 
at the twenty largest cities in the country concluded: 
[T]here is generally a lack of substance and depth in conferring 
guidance, restriction, or description beyond the constitutional bare 
minimum articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor 
that police use of force must be reasonable. Policies over-rely on 
reciting the basic constitutional standard for police engagements 
without providing key protections for citizens.276 
This is not unintentional, nor is it necessarily the result of sloppy 
draftsmanship or a lack of imagination. As criminologist Lorie Fridell and police 
executives Steve Ijames and Michael Berkow have pointed out, perspectives on 
agency use-of-force policies can be divided into two categories: the “continuum” 
approach advocates for detailed policies that often include a graphical guide (a 
“use of force matrix” or “use of force continuum”), and the “just be reasonable” 
approach advocates against providing any more detail than the titular 
instruction.277 One senior instructor at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center, for example, argued that “models and continuums” that provide more 
explicit guidance to officers about which force options to use in different 
circumstances are inconsistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.278 As a 
 
 275 D.C. METRO. POLICE, GENERAL ORDER: USE OF FORCE 1–2 (2002), https://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/56996151cbced68b170389f4/t/569bf3c740667a727ee7ef39/1453061069584/DC+Metropolitan+police+
use+of+force+policy.pdf. 
 276 Obasogie & Newman, supra note 25, at 286–87. 
 277 Lorie A. Fridell, Steve Ijames & Michael Berkow, Taking the Strawman to the Ground: Arguments in 
Support of the Linear Use-of-Force Continuum, POLICE CHIEF, Dec. 2011, at 20. 
 278 See John Bostain, Use of Force: Are Continuums Still Necessary?, 4 FED. L. ENF’T TRAINING CTR. J. 
33, 33 (2006). 
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result, as Brandon Garrett and I have written, “some policies simply ape the 
Fourth Amendment standard.”279 And as it turns out, they do so in a number of 
different ways. 
Some agencies incorporate the constitutional standard, in whole or in part, 
into the administrative standard governing the degree to which force is 
permitted. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, states that officers 
“may use only that force which is ‘objectively reasonable,’” and then explicitly 
adopts the Graham Court’s articulation of reasonableness.280 The Portland 
(Oregon) Police Department has promulgated a similar policy: 
This Directive adopts the constitutional standard for the use of force 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 
and subsequent case law as an outside limit on the amount of force that 
members may use. In this Directive, the Portland Police Bureau 
prohibits force that is not objectively reasonable under the 
constitutional standard.281 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office has adopted a comparable approach 
with a policy that prohibits unreasonable force, then states explicitly that “the 
basis in determining whether force is ‘unreasonable’ shall be consistent with the 
Supreme Court decision of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).”282 
Further, many policies provide a framework for determining whether the 
constitutional requirement has been met in any given situation. Many of those 
policies state that the relevant facts and circumstances are those known to officer 
at the time,283 or those that a reasonable officer would have perceived at the 
time.284 Additionally, some policies specify how the relevant facts are to be 
determined. The Las Vegas Police Department policy, for example, authorizes 
officers to use the amount of force that is “necessary” and “within the range of 
‘objectively reasonable’ options,” further stating: 
The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from 
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 
20/20 vision of hindsight. The reasonableness [sic] must account for 
 
 279 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 55, at 284. 
 280 L.A. POLICE DEP’T, POLICY ON THE USE OF FORCE 556.10, lapdonline.org/lapd_manual/volume_1.htm. 
 281 PORTLAND POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE 1010.00, at 4.1. 
 282 L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., USE OF FORCE POLICY 3-10/030.00. 
 283 See, e.g., FORT WORTH POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 306.04(A). 
 284 See, e.g., OKLA. CITY POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL 554.0 (5th ed. 2014). 
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the fact that officers are often forced to make split-second judgments 
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving.285 
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office takes a similar approach: 
Department members are authorized to use only that amount of force 
that is objectively reasonable to perform their duties. “Objectively 
reasonable” means that Department members shall evaluate each 
situation requiring the use of force in light of the known circumstances, 
including, but not limited to, the severity of the crime at issue, whether 
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the member or 
others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting, in determining the 
necessity for force and the appropriate level of force. Department 
members maintain the right to self-defense and have a duty to protect 
the lives of others.286 
Many agencies’ policies state that the propriety of an officer’s use of force 
must be evaluated by reviewing the totality of the facts and circumstances.287 
Agencies often include the Graham factors among the totality of circumstances 
that can affect the permissibility of an officer’s use of force.288 At some agencies, 
the Graham factors are included in a more comprehensive list. The Cook 
County, Illinois, Sheriff’s Office, for example, includes some of the Graham 
factors (e.g., “seriousness of the crime committed”) among an enumerated, non-
exhaustive list of fourteen “facts and circumstances” that comprise the “totality 
of the circumstances.”289 Many other agencies, however, incorporate the 
Graham factors into their policies almost verbatim290 or with only a modicum 
of modification.291 The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department goes even 
 
 285 LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, USE OF FORCE POLICY 6/002.00(III). 
 286 L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., USE OF FORCE POLICY 3-10/020.00. 
 287 See, e.g., L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., supra note 282. 
 288 See, e.g., L.A. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 280. 
 289 COOK CNTY. SHERIFF’S ORDER, RESPONSE TO RESISTANCE/USE OF FORCE POLICY 11.2.1.0(V)(Q) 
(2011) (including, “1. Seriousness of crime committed[;] 2. Relative size/stature of the officer[;] 3. Number of 
subjects/officers[;] 4. Subject(s) access to weapons[;] 5. Gender, age, physical attributes of subject[;] 
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of victims or potential victims in the area[;] 10. Whether evidence is likely to be destroyed[;] 11. Mental status 
of subject[;] 12. Reasonable belief of harm to another or self[;] 13. Nature and stability of the event environment 
or location[;] 14. Amount of time available to reasonably establish control”). 
 290 See, e.g., PHX. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER: USE OF FORCE 1.5(3)(B)(2) (2013) (“Circumstances 
that may govern the reasonableness of using a particular force option include, but are not limited to: [t]he severity 
of the crime[;] [w]hether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others[; and w]hether 
the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”). 
 291 See, e.g., CONSOLIDATED CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, OFF. OF THE SHERIFF, GENERAL ORDER 
LXXII.6(72)(IV)(D) (authorizing the use of “non-deadly force” when it is “absolutely necessary and only to the 
degree needed,” while instructing officers to consider “1. [s]everity of the crime/situation at issue; 2. [w]hether 
the person is resisting the officer’s attempt to place him in custody, or attempting to evade an officer by flight; 
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further, directing officers who are completing use of force reports to “[e]nsure 
each of the prongs of Graham v. Connor and the Objectively Reasonable Force 
factors are addressed.”292 
The preceding paragraphs illustrate how police agencies often rely on or 
incorporate constitutional standards into their administrative regulation of police 
violence. I do not mean to suggest that the constitutional standards are 
necessarily incompatible with the goals of an administrative policy; there may 
be strong arguments, for example, for incorporating the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene into the administrative standard. It appears, 
however, that agencies are not carefully excising and adopting particularly 
appropriate aspects of Fourth Amendment analysis that happen to align with 
their administrative goals. Indeed, the prevalence with which police agencies 
purchase pre-generated policies from third-party vendors like Lexipol293 
suggests that agencies may be adopting generic standards in lieu of engaging in 
collaborative, stakeholder-informed policymaking that is responsive to local 
circumstances and concerns. 
C. Police Culture 
The constitutional standards that govern police uses of force do not just 
inform police agencies’ written policies, they also shape industry norms. Police 
organizations have, inter alia, turned to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when 
advocating on issues of public policy, asserting that maintaining the standard 
adopted in Graham v. Connor is essential to crime-fighting efforts and officer 
safety. The Court’s admonition that the constitutionality of an officer’s use of 
force is to be assessed by looking to the facts and circumstances as they would 
have been perceived by a reasonable officer on the scene, meanwhile, is 
frequently used to bolster arguments against meaningful review. 
In 2016, the Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) convened a summit 
of almost 200 high-level police officials, academics, and others to discuss the 
use of force.294 The self-stated goal was to identify “changes in policies, training, 
tactics, and equipment that provide officers with better tools for handling 
 
3. [w]hether the person poses an imminent threat to the safety of the officer(s) or others; or 4. [a]n inmate is 
attempting to disrupt the care, custody, and control of a correctional facility”). 
 292 LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, POST USE OF FORCE PROCEDURES, 6/002.04(V)(B)(2)(b). 
 293 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 96 TEX. 
L. REV. 891 (2018). 
 294 POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 13 (2016), https://www.policeforum. 
org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf. 
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difficult situations.”295 The resulting report—the culmination of not just that 
summit, but also a year and a half of focus groups, a national survey, prior 
conferences on training and community trust, and site visits in New York and 
Scotland—identified thirty “guiding principles” for police agencies and the 
industry as a whole to consider as they develop use-of-force policies and 
training.296 Among the “key insights”297 of the report were the following 
observations: 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 1989 decision in Graham v. 
Connor outlines broad principles regarding what police officers can 
legally do in possible use-of-force situations, but it does not provide 
specific guidance on what officers should do. . . . 
. . . 
The Graham decision offers little guidance . . . on how police agencies 
should devise their policies, strategies, tactics, and training regarding 
the wide range of use-of-force issues. The entire Graham decision is 
[fewer] than 10 pages, and nearly all of the opinion is devoted to 
detailing the facts of what happened in the case, the alternative legal 
arguments and approaches to considering use-of-force issues that the 
Supreme Court considered but rejected, and a concurring opinion by 
three justices. 
Thus, the Supreme Court provides broad principles, but leaves it to 
individual police agencies to determine how to incorporate those 
principles into their policies and training, in order to teach officers how 
to perform their duties on a daily basis.298 
Those observations led PERF to recommend, as its second guiding principle, 
that “[a]gencies should continue to develop best policies, practices, and training 
on use-of-force issues that go beyond the minimum requirements of Graham v. 
Connor.”299 
The backlash was swift and vehement. The International Association of 
Chiefs of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police—organizations that are not 
typically bedfellows when it comes to positions on police policy—promptly 
 
 295 Id. at 5. 
 296 Id. at 8–13, 25. 
 297 Id. at 13. 
 298 Id. at 15–16. 
 299 Id. at 35. An earlier version of the report adopted a different phrasing, suggesting that “[d]epartments 
should adopt policies that hold themselves to a higher standard than the legal requirements of Graham v. 
Connor.” CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES, USE OF FORCE: TAKING POLICING TO A HIGHER STANDARD: 30 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 2 (2016), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/30guidingprinciples.pdf.  
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released a joint statement “reject[ing] any call to require law enforcement 
agencies to unilaterally, and haphazardly, establish use-of-force guidelines that 
exceed the ‘objectively reasonable’ standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.”300 The New York State Association of Chiefs of Police published a 
lengthy article in its quarterly magazine that assessed PERF’s Guiding 
Principles, explicitly taking issue with how the advice to go beyond Graham 
could be interpreted.301 Articles criticizing PERF’s process and perspective, in 
addition to the actual substance of its recommendations, were printed in popular 
police-oriented sites, including Police1,302 Officer.com,303 and Law Officer.304 
Officers and union officials denounced police chiefs who supported PERF’s 
recommendations, with at least one union going so far as to call a vote of no 
confidence after learning that the chief intended to implement some of the 
PERF-backed reforms.305 
Two years later, in 2018, California Assemblymember Shirley Weber 
proposed amending what was, at the time, the single oldest, unamended police 
use-of-force statute in the country.306 Her Police Accountability and Community 
Protection Act would have replaced a codification of the “fleeing felon” rule 
with more a restrictive statute that authorized the use of deadly force only in 
those situations where it was “necessary to defend against a threat of imminent 
death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person.”307 The 
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California Peace Officers Association criticized the proposal for “rais[ing] the 
legal use of force standard” above that laid out in Graham v. Connor.308 As the 
president of the San Diego Police Officers Association wrote, “[a]bandoning the 
‘reasonableness’ standard pertaining to a police officer’s use of force set by 
Graham . . . would greatly hinder law enforcement officers and therefore 
endanger the communities they serve.”309 The International Association of 
Chiefs of Police again spoke out, releasing a Use of Force Position Paper that 
expressed “significant concerns with any legislation or proposed bills in the 
United States that create an unachievable standard for use of deadly force that is 
in direct conflict with the established standard of ‘objectively reasonable under 
the totality of the circumstances,’ set forth by Supreme Court, Graham v. Connor 
[sic].”310 
In both contexts—a police organization’s attempt to identify best practices 
and a legislative attempt to amend a statutory “fleeing felon” rule—Graham and 
its objective reasonableness standard provided the foundation for criticism and 
resistance. As the San Diego Police Officers Association president put it, 
anything other than continued reliance on the constitutional standard established 
in Graham would be “unrealistic and unacceptable.”311 
On a more granular level, policing has taken too far the Court’s caution that 
constitutional analysis must not be based on the “perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”312 In its Use 
of Force Position Paper, for example, the IACP expressed its concern that any 
standard other than the “objective reasonableness” framework would result in 
“endless scrutiny and second-guessing by investigators, prosecutors, and civil 
courts.”313 Within policing, the cultural norm against second guessing or, as it is 
derisively called, “Monday-morning quarterbacking” is justified by both 
fairness and instrumental concerns.314 With regard to fairness, there is the belief 
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that any ex post review of an officer’s use of force is fundamentally unfair 
because the pressures inherent in the situation simply cannot be appreciated by 
anyone who did not experience that exact situation. As I have written elsewhere, 
“Comments like ‘You weren’t there’ or ‘You don’t know what you would have 
done in that situation’ are a common refrain” within policing.315 While a strong 
version of this approach would effectively insulate an officer from review, a 
weaker version works to discredit any review by individuals who have not been 
in use-of-force situations (that is, by anyone other than other officers). Either 
way, the ultimate result is to discourage democratic accountability. 
The instrumental concern, on the other hand, is analogous to the so-called 
“Ferguson Effect,” a prediction that public scrutiny and criticism of officers will 
lead “police officers to withdraw from their duties in order to avoid being 
accused of excessive force or racial profiling” (the “de-policing” hypothesis).316 
De-policing, or so it is argued, will lead to an increase in crime.317 In the use-of-
force context, the instrumental concern is reflected in the prediction that 
aggressive review and criticism may lead officers to improperly hesitate or 
refrain from using force when the situation legitimately requires it, thus exposing 
themselves and others to unnecessary danger. Advocates of the instrumental 
concern find support in officers’ anecdotes, such as the statement of an officer 
who had previously been disarmed and knocked unconscious by a suspect: “A 
lot of officers are being too cautious because of what’s going on in the 
media. . . . I hesitated because I didn’t want to be in the media like I am right 
now.”318 
To be clear, Graham’s admonition that the operative facts and circumstances 
of a use of force are those that would have been known to a reasonable officer 
on the scene is not properly understood as precluding critical review; it merely 
provides the framework under which constitutional review should be conducted. 
Nevertheless, it has contributed to the development of cultural norms against 
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IV. CLEANING UP THE SPILLAGE 
Thus far, I have argued that the Fourth Amendment is a deeply flawed 
mechanism for regulating police violence and that the problematic constitutional 
standard has spilled over into state law, agency policy, and police culture. The 
problems could be alleviated, at least in part, by either shifting the constitutional 
regulation of police uses-of-force away from the Fourth Amendment—perhaps 
by returning to the due process standard rejected in Graham—or by improving 
the extant Fourth Amendment framework. In other work, I have explored ways 
to improve the constitutional framework, such as by including officer tactics, 
which can often create issues of path dependence, in the analysis;319 by 
evaluating officers’ actions against the backdrop of industry norms and 
evidence-based best practices;320 and by shifting the analysis from the nature of 
the subject’s actions to the extent to which those actions threaten a government 
interest.321 Other scholars, similarly, have argued for a range of modifications to 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,322 for an increase in the constitutionalization 
of police agency policies or training,323 and for regulating the use of force 
through other constitutional provisions.324 
In this discussion, I am focused explicitly—and narrowly—on the use of 
force by police. I acknowledge and generally support the many scholars and 
other commentators who have made the broader point that the use of force could 
be addressed in part by shifting the role of police agencies and the duties of 
police officers.325 Indeed, I have made that point myself, albeit less eloquently 
and with less emphasis than many others.326 Further, like others, I have argued 
that the first principles and culture of policing requires what can be radical 
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readjustment.327 It seems likely that any form of regulation will prove faulty 
when the very purposes for which society uses the police or the cultural values 
of policing itself are flawed. Those conversations are important, but are outside 
the scope of this Article, which is focused on the spillover effects of a flawed 
constitutional framework. 
In the same vein, the deep problems of the Fourth Amendment must 
themselves be corrected. This will require litigants to educate and persuade the 
courts that, often, the judicial understanding of “reasonable” force is not, in fact, 
reasonable. As I have argued elsewhere, judicial understandings should be more 
heavily based on observational information about policing than it currently is;328 
this too is outside the scope of this Article. 
Changing the contours of constitutional regulation—those that govern 
seizures generally and police violence specifically—are important, but there are 
other parts to the solution. To prevent or reduce Fourth Amendment spillage, 
state lawmakers and administrative policymakers should divorce statutory and 
administrative regulatory mechanisms from constitutional law. In this Part, I 
begin to explore that possibility. By necessity, this exploration will be brief; I do 
not here offer a model state constitutional amendment, for example, or to 
promulgate a model statute or model policy. Instead, my goal is to articulate the 
need for a robust public discussion about the regulation of police violence and 
to provide some preliminary topics of conversation, reserving for future work a 
complete examination of those topics. Specifically, I offer a simple, but powerful 
observation: the underlying interests protected by constitutional law are often 
distinct from the interests that underlie state law—constitutional or statutory—
or agency policy. The adoption of constitutional law as a sub-constitutional 
standard, then, may substantially under-protect divergent state or administrative 
interests. 
Whether wholesale or in part, the incorporation of constitutional standards 
into other regulatory frameworks is not entirely surprising. As Bill Stuntz 
pointed out more than a decade ago, Fourth Amendment doctrines can occupy 
the regulatory field, disincentivizing legislators from adding statutory 
supplements to extant constitutional standards.329 Experience suggests that 
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similar disincentives for police executives create obstacles to supplementing the 
Graham analysis. To a significant degree, this may be attributed to 
protectionism; the combination of the Fourth Amendment’s often highly 
deferential “objective reasonableness” standard and the doctrine of qualified 
immunity provide a significant barrier to legal liability330 or, in many cases, to 
determining whether an officer’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment in the 
first place.331 
The interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, however, are both 
distinct and, in many cases, readily distinguishable from the interests that 
underlie state law and agency policy. It is widely accepted that the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures was intended 
to limit the exercise of government power to those circumstances when the 
public interest in order outweighs the individual interest in liberty, bodily 
autonomy, or privacy.332 This interest is in service to the Constitution’s ultimate 
object: codifying a political philosophy superior to the Articles of Confederation 
or the monarchy that preceded them by laying out a series of “negative rights.”333 
This structure provides plausible, though not inarguable, bases for concluding 
that the Fourth Amendment should not extend to certain aspects of police 
violence, such as attempts that do not physically connect with any target or those 
that do not actually restrict an individual’s freedom of movement. Even when 
an officer’s use of force should not be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation 
(because it does not amount to a seizure), though, it may properly be the subject 
of regulation by state law or agency policy. 
States, of course, have an interest in appropriately limiting the authority of 
government agents to enforce state and local laws that is conceptually identical 
to the constitutional interest, although states are free to put a thumb on the scales 
by imposing more stringent limits on government authority than the Constitution 
demands. The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, ruled that a provision of the 
state’s constitution that is worded almost identically to the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits vehicle inventory searches that lack probable cause, even though such 
 
 330 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 60–61 (2018); 
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 70 (2017); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About 
Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 231–32 (2005). 
 331 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 (2010). 
 332 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 480 (2011) (contending that the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is marked by a 
series of expansions and contractions of government agents’ constitutional authority that compensate for 
“changing technology and social practice”). 
 333 Jackson v. Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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searches would comply with constitutional precedent.334 In the same vein, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that consent-based searches of vehicles were 
prohibited by the state’s constitution even though they are permitted by the 
Fourth Amendment,335 and the South Carolina Supreme Court held that officers 
must have reasonable suspicion before conducting a “knock-and-talk” even 
though the Fourth Amendment has no such requirement.336 In each case, the 
Fourth Amendment and respective state’s constitutional law both balance the 
same public and private interests. The difference is that the states have come to 
different conclusions about how those interests should be balanced. The states 
could take a similar tack in the context of police violence. A California court, 
for example, has held that the concept of “reasonableness” is narrower in the 
context of state negligence law than it is in the constitutional context, such that 
an officer’s action that is considered “reasonable” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes may be unreasonable as a matter of state law.337 
States also have a distinct interest from that which undergirds the Fourth 
Amendment: protecting public safety and welfare. Where the Fourth 
Amendment and state law analogs may regulate police uses of force as exercises 
of government authority, states can also regulate them as violence (or, relatedly, 
as threats of violence). “The state claims of assault and battery allege physical 
harm as a result of the police conduct,”338 which courts have recognized as 
distinct from the deprivation of a constitutional right.339 Thus, an officer’s use 
of force can constitute a potential infringement on interests protected by state 
law regardless of whether it also implicates constitutional concerns.340 This is 
not to suggest police uses of force always or typically constitute crimes, of 
course; it is merely to advance the observation that the state has an interest in 
regulating the use of force that is distinct from the constitutional interest in 
balancing the power dynamic between the government and the governed. 
Although it seems plausible that Congress could enact use-of-force legislation 
 
 334 Compare State v. Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794, 797–98 (Iowa 2018), with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 372 (1976). 
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218, 219, 223 (1973). 
 336 Compare State v. Counts, 776 S.E.2d 59, 65 (S.C. 2015), with Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 
(2013). 
 337 Hayes v. San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 263 (Cal. 2013). 
 338 Sudul v. Hamtramck 562 N.W.2d 478, 487 (Mich. App. 1997) (Murphy, P.J., concurring) (citing 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 9, 10 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen 
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 339 See Garner v. Mich. State Univ., 462 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Mich. App. 1990). 
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under its authority to safeguard due process,341 it is worth pointing out that 
Congress has a rather limited ability to enact criminal laws, as least as compared 
to the states. The Constitution generally prohibits the federal government from 
exercising the “police power,” reserving such authority for the states. As the 
Court wrote, “[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which 
the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than 
the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”342 The state 
interest is both clear and straightforward in a way that the federal interest may 
not be. 
Unfortunately, merely having state laws that build on the constitutional 
standard is not guaranteed to clean up the Fourth Amendment spillage. Several 
states, for example, have adopted statutory exhaustion requirements that permit 
officers to use deadly force only when “all other reasonable means of 
apprehension have been exhausted,”343 when “a person cannot be captured any 
other way,”344 or when “there is apparently no other possible means of effecting 
the arrest.”345 Despite this statutory language, I have been unable to find a single 
case in which the exhaustion requirements in Iowa, Delaware, New Hampshire, 
or Tennessee played any significant role in the judicial analysis of a use of force 
incident. 
This may be because the constitutional framework has so colored 
interpretations of state law. This stands in sharp contrast to the way courts have 
understood the Fourth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit, in which Iowa sits, has 
rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment incorporates any type of force 
minimization or exhaustion requirement, holding: 
The Fourth Amendment inquiry focuses not on . . . whether there were 
other alternatives available, but instead whether the seizure actually 
effectuated falls within a range of conduct which is objectively 
“reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Alternative measures 
which 20/20 hindsight reveal to be less intrusive (or more 
prudent) . . . are simply not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.346 
 
 341 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 342 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
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The Tenth Circuit put it more succinctly: the Fourth Amendment “do[es] not 
require [police] to use the least intrusive means in the course of a detention, only 
reasonable ones.”347 
Were state law more cleanly divorced from constitutional law, the various 
types of state statutory provisions that go beyond the Fourth Amendment’s 
minimum requirements may be given more effect by the courts that interpret 
them.348 
A few states have recognized that the interests protected by state law support 
rejecting the constitutional framework for police violence. In New York, for 
example, the state court discussed Graham, ultimately concluding that the 
constitutional framework did not provide an appropriate model for state law.349 
In California, the state supreme court held that “state negligence law . . . is 
broader than federal Fourth Amendment law,” such that a use of force that was 
“reasonable” for constitutional purposes could be considered negligent for 
purposes of state law.350 A Mississippi court made a similar point: 
[A]s a general rule, remedies under civil rights law are not nearly as 
broad as those available under state law. While a state law plaintiff is 
allowed to recover damages for any unwanted touching under the 
common law of battery, federal remedies under § 1983 are only 
available for more egregious conduct.351 
Given the various infirmities of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, other states 
should adopt a clear distinction between constitutional law and state law. 
Like states, individual police agencies have an interest in regulating police 
uses of force that is quite distinct from constitutional concerns; officer training 
and administrative policies must take into account limited resources, officers’ 
effectiveness in advancing law enforcement and public safety goals, officer 
safety, public trust and perceptions of legitimacy, and a number of other 
considerations. While certainly relevant to those broader considerations, the 
constitutional rules governing police violence are not necessarily salient; 
agencies might be expected to prioritize a range of non-constitutional issues, 
reducing the relative importance of the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
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There are a number of different ways in which agencies—preferably 
working collaboratively with the communities they serve—could develop 
policies that balance these different competing priorities. The Washington, D.C., 
Metropolitan Police Department policy serves again as an example: it makes 
clear that the agency has adopted a restrictive approach, stating on the first page 
of its policy that an officer “shall use the minimum amount of force that the 
objectively reasonable officer would use in light of the circumstances to 
effectively bring an incident or person under control, while protecting the lives 
of the member or others.”352 Other agencies have adopted similar “force 
minimization” policies.353 As those examples demonstrate, there is ample room 
for localization, and not just in a sense of the “use of force policy” or “response 
to resistance policy” adopted by the particular agency. An agency’s decision not 
to equip officers with TASERs, for example, will have implications on whether 
and how officers use force even though that decision will likely not be reflected 
in written policy. 
Of course, it will take more than the adoption of some new policy language 
or other administrative action to effectively disentangle the constitutional 
framework from how an agency regulates the use of force. Agencies must be 
alert to the possibility that their policies will purport to limit the use of force 
more stringently than the Fourth Amendment, but officer actions will continue 
to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment framework. Both the Los Angeles 
Police Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, for example, 
restrict when officers can shoot at moving vehicles in a way that the Supreme 
Court has not.354 As described above, however, both have also explicitly adopted 
the Graham v. Connor framework for determining whether officers acted 
reasonably.355 The effective extrication of constitutional law from agency policy 
would require those agencies to recognize that there may be circumstances when 
shooting at a moving vehicle is objectively reasonable even though the policy 
justifications that would permit such action are not met. Concluding that a 
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shooting was authorized under the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Office’s policies that 
permit such behavior in “extraordinary” circumstances, for example, because 
the shooting was objectively reasonable would collapse putatively separate 
standards. 
Recognizing that state and agency interests are distinct from the 
constitutional interest in regulating police uses of force should serve as an 
incentive to develop state or agency regulation independently of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
What rules regulate police violence? The most obvious answer, for legal 
scholars and police officers alike, is the Fourth Amendment’s “objective 
reasonableness” standard, adopted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Connor.356 Within policing, it has been fervently argued that the constitutional 
standard is the only relevant or appropriate form of regulation.357 That argument, 
however, misses the fact that the Fourth Amendment does not regulate police 
uses of force. It applies only to the extent that officers’ actions amount to 
seizures, a doctrinal limitation that simply excludes some uses of force, 
including fatal police shootings. When the Fourth Amendment does apply, it 
provides little to no guidance to officers about whether and how to use force. 
The framework it establishes for evaluating officer actions is equally vacuous; 
the well-known Graham factors are of limited analytical value, are not well 
defined, and are woefully incomplete. In sum, the Fourth Amendment is a 
profoundly flawed framework for regulating police violence. 
The Fourth Amendment’s flaws would be troubling enough in the 
constitutional context, but the Graham framework has spilled over into the sub-
constitutional regulation of police violence. Courts in more than half the states 
have turned to constitutional law when interpreting state statutes or 
constitutional provisions, referencing, relying on, or, most problematically, 
explicitly incorporating Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into state law. 
Although empirical evidence is scarce, there is reason to believe that state 
statutes that explicitly limit officers beyond the Constitution’s minimum level 
protection for individual rights—such as statutory exhaustion that permits 
officers to use deadly force only when all other reasonable alternatives have been 
attempted—have been given short shrift because of the spillover effect of 
 
 356 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 357 See supra Part III.C. 
STOUGHTON_1.21.21 1/21/2021 2:45 PM 
2020] THE REGULATION OF POLICE VIOLENCE 585 
constitutional law. Individual police agencies, similarly, incorporate Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence into their administrative use-of-force policies, not 
just by describing it as a relevant legal standard but by adopting the Graham v. 
Connor framework whole cloth or with minimal alterations. More broadly, 
police culture as a whole has taken the position that the Fourth Amendment is 
the only relevant and appropriate standard under which officer actions can be 
reviewed. 
The spillage of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into sub-constitutional 
regulation should be cleaned up, and not just because of the many weaknesses 
of constitutional law. The Constitution, state law, and police agency policies 
have distinct regulatory goals. While the Constitution is concerned primarily 
with balancing government authority against individual liberty, state law seeks 
to do that while also appropriately protecting community members from 
physical threats and violence. Police agencies, meanwhile, must balance a host 
of competing priorities, including the immediate and long-term effectiveness of 
enforcement activities, officer safety, and public trust. The state and agency 
goals are not just distinct from the goals of the Fourth Amendment, they are 
divergent; rules that might serve to advance the constitutional interest will fall 
short, often substantially short, of adequately advancing state or agency 
interests. 
The problem of police violence is multifaceted, as is the solution. This 
Article has gone beyond existing scholarship by arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment itself frustrates the effective regulation of police violence.  It would 
behoove scholars, elected officials, policymakers, and community members who 
contemplate how to better manage the use of force to be attuned to the value of 
divorcing the Fourth Amendment framework from state law and agency policy. 
 
